Gaming & Gambling

20 years without gambling

Carlos Lalanda ·

In the Valencian Community, authorities of every political persuasion have been regarded as the most advanced in the world in certain sectors and initiatives. This attitude and pride deserve praise rather than criticism, dating back as they do to medieval times and epics (a resounding example: there is no need to search any longer for the Holy Grail; it is physically in Valencia Cathedral and anyone can see it), right up to yesterday itself (approval for the electric battery factory in Sagunto).

But I am now referring to the supposed progress in policies to protect gamblers in games of chance, which
is indeed highly open to criticism, beginning with Autonomous Community Law 1/2020 on Gambling, which the honourable members of the regional parliament, in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, processed and transmuted even in its name, under the pretext of being at the forefront of protection, at the expense of restricting the offering of Valencian businesses, which until then had been more or less well adapted to the hyper-regulation of obligations, duties and guarantees, and to the excessive taxation of their activities.

More specifically, I shall now analyse the scope of registration, and the duration of registration, of the “self-prohibited, in the so-called Register of Persons Excluded from Access to Gambling, which a Draft Decree that has been made public seeks to set at between 3 and 20 years. A pioneering measure, unique in the world.

The Draft Decree of the Consell on the Register of Persons Excluded from Access to Gambling (and other measures).

Although the innovations and restrictions outlined in that Law, pending regulatory implementation, are numerous, there is one on which I wish to dwell: the duration of entries in that Register introduced by the Draft Decree published for public consultation, concerning the rules governing “prohibited” persons, or rather “self-prohibited” persons.

The Valencian Law mentions this Register in Article 21 and delegates its content, organisation and operation to regulations, making a brief restrictive reference to the requirement that this Register must contain (only) “the data strictly necessary for the purposes of the Law”. This article also states that mechanisms for coordination with other equivalent registers in the State may be established, including through the interconnection of Registers.

Sheer inertia, since, from the time the first “Register of prohibited persons” was introduced in the State, back in 1979 with the first Bingo and Casino Regulations, no one has taken a theoretical step towards defining this legal institution, whose existence only makes logical sense alongside the other side of the coin: effectively making its data available to the establishments where those registered must be “prohibited” from entering; this is also contained in Article 22 of the Valencian Law, which refers to the regulation of admission controls at establishments, their technical characteristics, components and other physical arrangements that must be implemented to receive the information from that Register.

Thus, the Draft now submitted for public consultation includes two groups of rules on this particular matter, concerning, on the one hand, the organisation, content and procedures inherent in the Register; and, on the other, the obligations and technical components for the operators of establishments, which I shall not discuss. One cannot work without the other, but I shall refer only to the former, those regulating the Register, Articles 3 to 9.

First, however, I consider it appropriate to explore several essential questions: what is self-prohibition? who may regulate it? “what kind of “administrative registers” can meet the need for which they are created?

What is “self-prohibition”?

The curious word and term “self-prohibition” does not appear in the RAE Dictionary. It is a figure of speech within the category of “oxymorons” (words incorporating two concepts of opposite meaning), because in Ethics and Law there is a concept of prohibition, which more or less consists of placing limits on human activities by the moral or political authorities vested with the power to impose them, in order to prevent anarchy. And this requires two parties: the party imposing the prohibition and its addressee.

Imposing a prohibition on oneself against doing something one is permitted to do is therefore a play on words that is better understood if we describe it as a “waiver” of a personal freedom. This applies to numerous scenarios (“celibacy”, meaning not marrying for religious reasons; a “vow of chastity”, which is something similar but different; “vegetarianism”, meaning not consuming food from the animal kingdom; even “suicide”, relinquishing life, etc.).

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft presented by the Valencian Community states that the regulation of the Register of Prohibited Persons (with a longer name, coined in the Valencian Community in an Order of 2017), “reflects the legislature's efforts to help those persons who voluntarily approach the administration to exercise their right to prohibit themselves from accessing gambling establishments”.

The quotation refers to “self-prohibited” persons, generally understood to be individuals who relinquish participation in games of chance in order to avoid engaging in this activity beyond the control of their will; an activity which, in Spain and many other countries where it is not prohibited, is in itself a genuine civil liberty forming part of the citizen's body of freedoms, without needing to appear, for example, in the Constitution, but rather being one of those included within the freedom to “enter into contracts”, which is fully enjoyed upon reaching the age of majority.

In short, in that article the Valencian legislature disclaimed and transferred to regulations the responsibility involved in thus limiting Valencians' freedom to gamble, a responsibility which, as we shall also see below, does not fall within its remit either.

Characteristics, procedures and content of registration under the Draft.

What matters, when the objective is to “help” someone who by definition has some reason for self-prohibition, is that bureaucracy should be kept to an absolute minimum, so any simplification of procedures is welcome. In this day and age, the efforts of the Directorate-General for the Regulation of Gambling (DGOJ) to implement an electronic system via mobile phone using an APP are commendable, for example[1]…. but it only works for Android browsers (Samsung phones), not Safari (Apple phones). I shall not dwell on this point, nor on the provisions of the Draft governing the bureaucracy of registration or its cancellation.

I must, however, dwell on Article 7 of the Draft, which concerns the “duration of registration”. A minimum of 3 years and a maximum of 20 years, even if the applicant requests less, or requests more. Even if, after two days or 2 months, the already registered applicant “regrets” having waived the right to gamble, they will not be able to cancel the registration.

This regulation of the “duration of registration” may be regarded as a “pioneering” decision, unique in the world, because wherever these Registers exist[2], at least in the EU, the period before “revocability” is usually much shorter (several days, several months, up to 12 months in some). Moreover, the mechanism used is “self-exclusion”, which centres on gambling companies, which receive requests from their customers. In Spain, in many Autonomous Communities and in the Valencian Community, the minimum duration has been 6 months. Compared with the exceptional case of France, 3 years, renewable in 3-year periods, the Valencian Community nevertheless wins on the maximum period, although it is true that the Draft provides that, after 3 years, a person who applied and registered for 20 years may cancel it if they pay a fee. (Article 9(e) of the Draft).

It might also be argued that, since the legislative delegation is unspecified and general, the Consell of the Generalitat may do whatever it wishes in this respect, and no one can object.

But there is something else, and something much more important. The question must be asked whether the Valencian Government, or indeed the Valencian Autonomous Community, has the power to do so.

So-called “self-prohibitions” cannot be at the disposal of the Legislature of an Autonomous Community, still less of the Consell of the Generalitat, which is merely the “executive” power of the Valencian Community.

If one accepts the foregoing proposition that the “self-prohibitions” to which we refer are actually “waivers” of the freedom to gamble, and that this forms part of personal status, any regulation or limitation must fall to the authority holding power over that personal status, which in Spain is none other than the central State . Unlike “Federal States”, where “personal” sovereignty lies with the various constituent lower-level state entities, in Spain “decentralisation” does not extend to power over Civil or Criminal Legislation, among other matters, which are matters of State “sovereignty”. For example, in the USA, it is the States that determine the age of majority, the content of the Criminal Code, and the Civil Laws applicable to “their citizens”. In the Valencian Community there are no “Valencian citizens” (in the legal sense of the term), but rather Spanish citizens with administrative residence in the Valencian Community (Article 3.1 of the Statute of Autonomy).

The Legislative Power of the Autonomous Communities cannot restrict the minimum age for gambling (which is the age of majority, since that is the age permitting full capacity to “contract”), and although, hypothetically, it could even prohibit the “offering of games of chance in establishments within its territory” (well, this prohibition would have to be analysed from the perspective of other freedoms, such as the freedom to conduct a business, etc.), it certainly could not prohibit Valencians from travelling to other Autonomous Communities to gamble, or from gambling online on their mobile phones.

Thus, in my opinion, the Valencian Community, like the others, cannot regulate the scope and content of a “self-prohibition”. Neither the Statute nor the Royal Decree on the transfer of powers and functions (Royal Decree 1038/1985) mentions this Register or matter, and the State reserves all powers “not inherent” in the powers transferred.

And if, ultimately, the Valencian Law delegates to the Consell's Regulations the power to regulate a “Register of Prohibited Persons” without any limitation, that “absence of limitation” can only operate in relation to its practical “organisation”, but not in relation to the content of “self-prohibition”, on which the Law says nothing.

State and regional inertia

The problem identified is even greater if we consider the regulatory development of this institution of the “Register of prohibited persons” once the various “Autonomous Community Registers” (under different names) were introduced in Spain, in purported exercise of the Autonomous Communities' powers over games of chance, which were being included in the various Statutes of Autonomy, and in the regulation (always “minimal” or non-existent at Autonomous Community level) of these instruments.

Each did and does it “in its own way”.

Inertia in the Valencian Community involved managing a “computerised file” available to officials, called “PROBLEM GAMBLERS” under an old rule regulating databases. The trail continues in the Order of 21 June 2002, which renamed this file “Access to casinos, bingo halls and gaming halls (Register of restrictions)”; and finally in Order 13/2017, of 10 November, which adopted the current name. Finally, the Law of 2020 gives legal status to the Register under this name.

In most Autonomous Communities, registration of “self-prohibition” may be requested by “types of gambling” (for entry to casinos, bingo halls, gaming halls or betting premises), and is valid for all establishments in the Autonomous Community; but there is an exception, where self-prohibition may even be requested for just one specific establishment. In the absence of legislative guidance, regulatory imagination can be prolific.

Many wonder how it is possible to split up the act of self-prohibition if, as we have said, it is bound up with reinforcing or assisting the avoidance of excesses beyond the control of the will. If someone relinquishes gambling and wishes this to be recorded in a Register, and subsequently by the establishments' admission services, in order to prevent their entry, this must encompass all types of games of chance, including lotteries, football pools, etc., which, as recent studies have shown, form an important part of the problematic aspect of gambling. And it must apply to every kind of establishment.

Furthermore, if this self-prohibition regime is “fragmented” by Autonomous Community, how can it be justified that a self-prohibited person may play the same games available in their own Community in another establishment situated in another Autonomous Community, even one closer to their home?

Lastly, and since the fact is that the “distorted State” Register of Prohibited Persons was revitalised when, in 2011, the State developed the rules on online gambling at national level, the above contradictions (arising from the existence of multiple registers) became even more apparent, with categories of “State self-prohibited persons” and “Autonomous Community self-prohibited persons”. Neither the Law on the Regulation of Gambling, nor the Autonomous Communities' Laws or Regulations, nor the officials responsible for their respective management have been able to resolve this fragmentation and dilemma, beyond referring to “Interconnection Agreements” between Registers, some of which already exist, and indeed the recent Law 23/2022 now includes them once again in the legal array of improvements to the State Gambling Law.

The Valencian Community itself provides for them in Article 21, but no provision on this matter is to be found in the Draft; rather than regulation, it requires a willingness to cooperate and sufficient technical capability to resolve it. Moreover, the provisions of the Draft concerning technical access control systems in establishments mention “other equivalent official “Registers”, but nothing more.

State powers and Autonomous Community powers

Beyond the “inertia” identified above, someone will have to resolve in some way what role the State, as a sovereign entity, has in relation to this freedom of citizens (and its limitations), to which I referred earlier and which I ventured to describe as a “waiver”.

It is commendable that both the Autonomous Communities and the State emphasise the possibility of “coordination” through the “interconnection of Registers”. But since, fundamentally, this concerns the regulation of an aspect falling within civil liberties…… would it not be bolder and more useful, in relation to “self-prohibitions” on gambling, to invoke the State's power over civil legislation, contained in Article 149.1.8 of the Spanish Constitution (CE)?

Interconnections are increasingly technically feasible and possible (as is the other side of the coin, likewise difficult to resolve until recently: effectively transmitting registration data to establishments so that the idea is applied in practice).

But eliminating the Autonomous Community Registers, while correspondingly strengthening the State Register, would be more effective still.

And in that latter scenario, it would no longer be necessary to invoke the unconstitutionality of Article 7 of the Valencian Draft under discussion. Moreover, the remaining articles, from 3 to 9, could be deleted.

Carlos Lalanda Fernández.

Madrid, 15 November 2022.


[1] https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.appjuego&pli=1

[2] We focus on regulation in EU countries, which is perhaps the most advanced in this field. See Margaret Carran's Study on these and other regulations in EU countries: https://www.egba.eu/uploads/2018/12/181206-Consumer-Protection-in-EU-Online-Gambling-EBGA-Report-December-2018.pdf

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