Gaming & Gambling

The AEAT and DGOJ Agreement on online gambling: one of Big …Sister’s children

Carlos Lalanda ·

“Big Brother” (understood as the Supercomputer that watches over everything in the service of power, portrayed and so named by George Orwell in his famous novel “1984”).

“Big Sister” is how many refer to the State Tax Administration Agency (AEAT), which stores the data of numerous taxpayers in its databases and cross-references them for tax purposes.

The publicity given to the recent Cooperation Agreement signed on 16 December  2014 between the State Tax Administration Agency (AEAT) and the Directorate-General for the Regulation of Gambling (DGOJ) for the “exchange of information” obliges us to reflect briefly on some consequences of this and other forthcoming disclosures of gamblers’ data.

The Agreement can be read at http://www.dgojuego.minhap.gob.es/es/art-convenio-aeat-dgoj.

We are vaguely aware of the voracious appetite for data of the “Big Sister” that the AEAT has become when collecting information en masse for purposes within its remit. That is, to assist in compliance with tax obligations.

The successive obligations to report and disclose taxpayers’ data have been accompanied by the implementation of increasingly sophisticated IT resources and systems

The now obsolete computer “Berta ” used by the police was replaced by “Clara” around the year 2000, and then “Rita” became the star of tax data computers, leading to today’s “Sara”, which is more a network of computers or, rather, a “set of communications infrastructures and basic services connecting the networks of Spanish Public Administrations and European Institutions, facilitating the exchange of information and access to services”.

What information do the tax authorities generally receive, and for what purpose?

It is prudent to reflect on the limits of the information  that the AEAT receives or should receive for its legitimate purposes, and on the obligations to supply information,  which are sometimes the subject of legal and even constitutional disputes.

The “duty to provide information” is included as a concept of social cooperation in the application of taxes, enshrined in several provisions of the General Tax Law. In particular, Article 92.4 refers to the use of electronic, computerised and telematic techniques and resources.

To summarise very briefly the entire body of rules containing these duties, the law distinguishes, on the one hand, the information obligations of private or public persons or entities concerning data of “tax relevance” relating to those persons  with whom they have dealings; and, on the other, the special obligations of public persons and entities (and those treated as such)  concerning the data they collect pursuant to provisions of general application or “specific” requests.

In none of these cases does the transmission of information to the tax authorities require the “consent of the data subject”, who is the potential taxpayer, and who is thus indirectly “watched” or “monitored”.

As common sense would suggest, the ultimate legitimate purpose of all this movement of data is to improve oversight of taxpayers and, ultimately, to assist in fulfilling their duty to contribute to public expenditure, under Article 31 of the Spanish Constitution (CE). But within certain limits.

With this justification, the advance of the “Big Sister” that is the AEAT has been constant and almost unstoppable, marked by successive and persistent incursions and experiments that have sometimes proved contrary to the Law: for example, the mass collection of banking data was declared null and void by the Supreme Court (TS), and the Constitutional Court (TC) declared certain laws in this regard unconstitutional.

We shall now see how the Agreement signed between the AEAT and the DGOJ fits into the framework concerning online gambling operators’ data and, above all, the lack of a lawful basis for disclosing players’ data.

The privacy of players’ and games’ data.

Until the advent of online gambling channels, it was practically inconceivable and impossible to know the data “for each and every round of the games ” played at all hours and through multiple establishments and channels. How far any authority’s monitoring and use of citizens’ information should extend is a debate that cuts across all kinds of everyday, business and legal settings and, unsurprisingly, the field of gambling.

Defining and protecting “privacy” is one of the compelling concerns in our society today, including in relation to gambling. It was traditionally and almost unanimously accepted that the “player” did not wish to be seen gambling, not even in public premises, and the image of “private rooms in casinos” is a classic one. Even now, with online gambling, nobody wants to identify themselves by name, but rather through “nicknames” or “pseudonyms”. Something that psychologists should explain in greater detail. Although recently there has been an obvious exception in the multimillion-pound poker games exploited by the media, where winning players obtain large sums of money and a certain degree of “public recognition”.

But nobody has so far ventured to say whether the bet itself or the prize that may be won forms part of “privacy”. For example, must the name of the winner of a major Lottery prize be published, or does that person have a right “not to be identified”?

There were already different perspectives on this privacy, since, for various reasons, several regulations impose an obligation on individuals to “identify themselves” at certain admission services in public premises (for reasons of public order, the exclusion of minors and user protection); at casino exchange services (for anti-money laundering reasons); or when receiving certain prizes (for tax reasons). Recently, for anti-money laundering reasons, all kinds of companies paying prizes exceeding 2,500 Euros have been obliged to identify the winning player, including lottery winners.

Nobody had required, or thought it necessary to require, the identification of each and every round and transaction of players, both because of its lack of usefulness and because of its practical difficulty or impossibility.

It is true that the arrival of online gambling introduced an important innovation in this field, since something hitherto inconceivable in traditional games became possible: identifying and recording, round by round, bet by bet, who won and who lost in each “hand or stake”; something that the regulator under the Spanish Gambling Law took literally, making it compulsory for reasons of oversight and purported prevention, even with the capacity to monitor every movement of addicts, cardsharps, certain money launderers, minors concealing their identity, etc…….

As a knock-on effect, the technological opportunity to install biometric recognition (identification) devices in all kinds of establishments or devices where gambling takes place is highly topical. It is already possible to do so. And therefore the possibility of “total control” of every kind of transaction is open.

But this potential does not mean that such data are to be included in a large database, or that they may be disclosed because of their potential “tax relevance”

The players’ information held by the DGOJ. Its improper disclosure to the AEAT.

The Cooperation Agreement signed between the AEAT and the DGOJ contains two very different types of envisaged commitments to disclose data. One concerns the data of companies operating under online gambling licences, and another, quite different one, concerns their players’ financial data.

Its direct legal basis is undoubtedly Article 46.5 of Royal Decree 1614/2011 on gambling licences, authorisations and registers, which requires the periodic supply to the AEAT of data relevant to the administration of the “Tax on Gambling Activities” (IAJ), for which purpose an Agreement may be established.

This Tax (which is the same traditional “Gambling Levy” applied to online gambling operators) is calculated by applying a rate to the taxable base, which is in turn obtained by calculating the total bets placed and (in almost all games) deducting the amount of prizes paid to players. Calculated quarterly.

In short, the purpose of the information obtained by the AEAT from the DGOJ will be to cross-check the data self-assessed by operators against the data that may be obtained through their information obligations and that the DGOJ holds on them. And it can cross-check them because, under the complex and extensive technical regulations, all bets and transactions must pass through a “data warehouse” to which the DGOJ itself may have access in exercising its functions of oversight and supervision of online gambling.

The DGOJ has no tax powers. It may track players’ data, monitor them, trace them and analyse them, and, if pressed, metaphorically “snoop on them”. But its powers do not include “creating a large database of players’ financial data”. Nor can the data be said to be “its own”.

However, Clause Six of the Agreement (“nature of the data supplied”) agrees to supply not only data on online licensees’ operations, but also on each of the players, with their identification, and the data from each player’s gambling account, such as opening and closing balances, total deposits and stakes, total prizes and promotional bonuses.

We must ask ourselves …..what does the Gambling Tax (IAJ) have to do with players’ personal and financial data? Does the AEAT want these data in order subsequently to include them in the draft return for a different Tax, personal income tax (IRPF)? This is what would also appear to follow from the fact that the “information to be supplied relating to players shall be provided as totals for each calendar year ”.

And the foregoing is not merely an incidental issue. The Agreement itself assumes that the DGOJ “has” players’ data because a provision of general application obliges it, in turn, to collect them from operators (who are the ones who actually “possess” them, since the players are the customers with whom they have dealings). On the contrary, this is by no means the “legal” position of the data, as can be verified by tracing or examining the various rules imposing the different administrative obligations on operators  in their capacity as holders of an online licence. The supervisory Administration (the DGOJ, as successor to the powers of the defunct National Gambling Commission), has no power whatsoever to “collect the data” of players, and operators must, on the contrary, establish a genuine strategy for protecting participants’ data, as clearly stated in Article 15.3 of Law 13/2011 on the Regulation of Gambling. It is a different matter that both the Central Gambling Unit and its replica should incorporate secure computer connections compatible with the systems of the National Gambling Commission (CNJ), enabling it to supervise and monitor, in real time if required, the gambling activity conducted, the prizes awarded and the identity of persons, etc. ….. The Central Unit must be capable of being monitored by the CNJ, all for the purpose of verifying and checking the information” (Article 18.4).

In short, players’ financial “data” should not be collected en masse as a “Database” by the DGOJ, nor are operating companies obliged to do so. Nor should they be the subject of the Agreement with the AEAT.

Lastly, if the AEAT were to seek to obtain the data directly from licensed operators, it could not do so either because, once again, they are under no obligation to withhold anything from players in respect of IRPF, nor is this an activity in which the business is obliged to issue an invoice, these being the circumstances in which a business is obliged to report its customers’ figures.

From the monitored business to the “X-rayed” player.

It is true that the taxation of gambling has evolved in Spain, particularly in relation to IRPF, and has done so recently from an antediluvian position that had remained petrified for almost 30 years. On this point, I refer to an analysis in which I described how the Tax Law of 2013 removed the exemption for income obtained from prizes in public gambling (which became subject to tax at 20%) and, on the other hand, introduced the possibility of deducting losses incurred in gambling from the winnings obtained. But it is still inconceivable that, in most games, the player should become a “source of revenue” for IRPF because, as I stated in my article, the tax authorities have much more useful and precise instruments for raising tax revenue through the Gambling Levy, which taxes the business and not the player.

In today’s complex world of gambling, for the purposes of administrative intervention and taxation, the person “X-rayed” (in the sense of being analysed and required, exhaustively  and in detail, to declare and comply with tax obligations) is the business owner, not the player, who merely plays and enjoys themselves. Why is this change of perspective being sought?

Another case of mass disclosure of players’ financial data: the register of online lottery players of Catalonia’s EAJA.

For our purposes, and to complete this reflection, we can also cite the EAJA (Autonomous Gambling  and  Betting  Entity of the Generalitat) as another “Big Sister” when analysing the recently published ORDER ECO/276/2014, of 4 September. It creates and regulates the file containing the personal data of EAJA online lottery players, in which their personal data and the data relating to their bets and prizes will be recorded. This file may, once again, be “disclosed to the tax administration”.

Few would doubt that this Catalan Official Body was created in the image and likeness of LAE, which was the public body that succeeded the oldest State gambling Monopoly and which, until very recently, had the dual function of being a business (organising lotteries, football pools, etc.) while also forming part of the Administration: it was a Public Administration. This entailed, among other things, the curious coincidence that the very entity conducting or organising the gambling was the one laying down the rules.

Thus, the EAJA, for its part, continues to retain its status as an administrative Entity while also being the Manager and operator of various games and lotteries, likewise “monopolised” within its territory, which constitutes a unique case within a State that has not hitherto been considered “Federal”.

As a Public Body, it is obliged, under the Organic Law on Data Protection (LOPD), to submit files containing personal data for administrative approval by the Department to which it is attached, and to adapt to and comply with all the obligations inherent in any database of Public Administrations. Hence the ECO Order of the Department of Economy and Knowledge.

Consequently, this is the first public database (like the Social Security databases or those of the AEAT) in which the “financial data of gamblers” will be included, and for which disclosure to the tax administration is envisaged.

The EAJA thereby becomes yet another manifestation of “Big Brother”.

How far will “Big Brother” go? I believe that someone or something must curb it, since otherwise it will become usual and commonplace, for example, for the tax authorities to know the identity of shoppers in department stores together with all the details of their purchases, or that of those attending football grounds or protest demonstrations; TV audiences will be individually identified, just as it is already possible to know which mass-participation races we run, the times we achieve or the training sessions proposed by our coaches;

In the matter at hand, there is no lawful basis whatsoever, other than purely statistical purposes or mere snooping, for the State or the Generalitat to come to know how much or how each citizen gambles, whether at poker, the lottery, bingo, ludo, gaming machines or online gambling.

Carlos Lalanda Fernández.

Carlos.lalanda@loyra.com

28 December 2014

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