Tax & Private Clients
Comments on the Supreme Court judgment concerning the criminal liability of legal persons
·
On 29 February 2016, the Supreme Court published judgment No. 154/2016. This judgment was delivered by the full Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, comprising 15 judges, and includes seven separate opinions dissenting from the majority decision. Indeed, all indications are that deliberations on the matter were intense, as the judgment itself states that they extended from 17 December 2015 to 29 February 2016.
This judgment was eagerly awaited because, being delivered shortly after the publication of Circular 1/2016 of the State Prosecutor General’s Office, which took place on 22 January 2016, it would help legal practitioners understand the Supreme Court’s position on a matter of such importance and current relevance as the criminal liability of legal persons.
1. Background
In the judgment on which we shall comment, the Supreme Court examines the judgment previously delivered by the National High Court in which, among others, three companies were convicted for their involvement in an offence against public health consisting of trafficking more than 6,000 kilograms of cocaine concealed in machinery imported and exported between Spain and Venezuela. The National High Court sentenced the three defendant companies to dissolution, and the Supreme Court overturns that sentence for one of the companies and orders the National High Court to deliver a new judgment in respect of that company.
2. Adoption and effective implementation of a crime prevention model
The Supreme Court judgment contains points of considerable significance which depart radically, as we had already anticipated might happen in a previous note, from some of the interpretations adopted by the prosecution service in Circular 1/2016, of 22 January 2016, of the State Prosecutor General’s Office.
There is currently no doubt that, pursuant to Article 31 bis of the Criminal Code, legal persons are liable for offences committed in their name or on their behalf, and for their direct or indirect benefit, by their legal representatives or by those who, acting individually or as members of a body of the legal person, are authorised to take decisions in the name of the legal person or have powers of organisation and control within it.
Likewise, legal persons are liable for offences committed in the course of corporate activities, on their behalf and for their direct or indirect benefit, by those who, being subject to the authority of the natural persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph, have been able to carry out the acts because those natural persons have seriously breached their duties of supervision, monitoring and control of their activities, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case.
In the latter case, the legal person shall be exempt from liability if, before the offence was committed, it adopted plans and effectively implemented an organisation and management model which is appropriate, in accordance with the company’s particular characteristics, to prevent offences of the nature of the one committed or to reduce significantly the risk of their commission.
Accordingly, the criminal liability of legal persons is vicarious or representative in nature, such that, for a legal person to be prosecuted, it is a prior and indispensable requirement that a natural person within the organisation has committed an offence.
In our view, the most relevant issue raised at this point by the Supreme Court, and on which the judgment differs both from the views expressed by the State Prosecutor General’s Office and from those of the minority of judges who expressed their opinion in a separate opinion, concerns the treatment under criminal law of the exemption from liability which arises where, when the offence is committed by one of the company’s employees ( Article 31 bis, paragraph 1(b)), “before the offence was committed, the company adopted and effectively implemented an organisation and management model which is appropriate to prevent offences of the nature of the one committed or to reduce significantly the risk of their commission”.
In these cases, according to the judgment under examination, the Supreme Court takes the view that, if a particular legal person has implemented those control mechanisms and they are adequate, there is, in fact, no offence. This is because the Supreme Court considers that the existence of those controls affects the very basis of the legal person’s liability, such that their existence means that there is no offence and their absence means the opposite.
However, the Supreme Court does not stop there, but goes further and concludes that it is the prosecution that bears the obligation to establish the absence and ineffectiveness of those necessary controls in order for the legal person to be held liable for the offence.
For their part, neither the State Prosecutor General’s Office nor the minority judges agree with this approach, since they consider that it must be the defence, rather than the prosecution, that establishes that those controls do indeed exist and are effective.
3. The conflict of interest between the accused legal person and its legal representatives
Another of the points addressed by the judgment under examination concerns the right of defence of legal persons provided for in Article 24.2 of the Constitution. On this issue, the Supreme Court states that “we are thus faced with a significant problem in the Law”. This problem concerns the arrangements for appointing the person who is to act on behalf of the legal person in proceedings determining its criminal liability, not only to represent it but also to take the appropriate decisions concerning the defence strategy to be followed and to ensure that this is the most beneficial strategy for the legal person.
It is highly likely that, in cases where a legal person and its directors or representatives are tried simultaneously, there will be a clear conflict of interest between them, since what may benefit the natural persons may harm the legal persons and, it seems clear, in such situations the interests of the legal person may not prevail.
On this highly relevant issue, the Supreme Court recommends that judges and courts remain alert to ensure that such conflicts do not arise, and concludes its reasoning by stating: “such admonitions should likewise serve as a warning to the Legislature to remedy through legislation the possibility of undesirable situations of this kind arising, by means of appropriate regulation of the matter”.
4. Instrumental legal persons. “Front” companies
The judgment also addresses the issue of instrumental or front companies. On this point, the Supreme Court agrees with the State Prosecutor General’s Office and considers that purely instrumental or “front” companies, created exclusively to serve as an instrument for the commission of an offence by a natural person, must be regarded as falling outside the liability regime under Article 31 bis.
In these cases, where companies are merely an instrument for the commission of an offence and lack any substance of their own, the appropriate course is not to convict the company but to bring about its disappearance using any of the means provided for by the legal system, and its consequent and logical extinction.
5. Direct or indirect benefit
The judgment also examines one of the requirements forming the basis for a finding of criminal liability on the part of legal persons, namely the “direct or indirect benefit” to the company arising from the criminal act committed by the natural person.
On this point, the Supreme Court states that it wishes to make clear that the term “gain”, used in the former wording of the Criminal Code, or the new term “benefit”, refers to any kind of advantage, even a mere expectation or one relating to matters such as an improved position vis-à-vis competitors, which is beneficial to the profitability or mere survival of the legal person within which the offence is committed by its representative, director or subordinate. On this point, the Supreme Court expresses its agreement with the content of Circular 1/2016 of the State Prosecutor General’s Office.
It will be for the courts, in each individual case, to qualify their decisions on this matter, seeking to establish a genuine relationship between the offence committed and the obtaining of the advantage, gain or benefit, whether direct or indirect. On this issue, the Supreme Court recommends avoiding maximalist approaches, whether those which consider that there is always a benefit to the company, even if only the benefits arising from the savings achieved by not establishing compliance plans, or those which maintain that there is never any benefit to the company, because an offence always causes companies harm, even if only to their reputation.
6. Conclusions
The Supreme Court judgment analysed therefore contains the following key points:
– That the burden of proving the ineffectiveness of the organisation and management model established to prevent the offence committed or significantly reduce the risk of an offence being committed rests with the prosecution.
– That it is clear that legal persons, depending on their size and the characteristics of the activity in which they engage, should have approved and operational organisation and management models that prevent the commission of offences.
– That, in order to avoid the conflict of interest which could arise between the company’s director and the company where both are defendants, legal persons should, pending the legislative amendment recommended by the Supreme Court, establish defence procedures to avoid such conflicts.
Also published in Cinco Días