Tax & Private Clients
Criminal liability of legal persons: Commentary on the Supreme Court judgment of 16 March 2016.
Fernando Martín ·
Introduction
On 16 March 2016, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court delivered a new judgment addressing the complex issue of the criminal liability of legal persons. This judgment follows on from those delivered by the same Court on 2 September 2015 and 29 February 2016, as well as Circular 1/2016 of the State Prosecutor General’s Office.
In the judgment discussed here, the Supreme Court recalls the judgment delivered on 2 September, since its content will be of crucial importance to the judgment we are now considering. That judgment established that \»… whether a model of liability for one’s own acts or a formula of liability for the acts of another is adopted, it seems clear that any conviction of legal persons must be based on the non-negotiable principles underpinning criminal law\». This is a principle which the judgment under analysis seeks to make very clear from the outset of its reasoning.
Facts
The facts leading to this judgment may be summarised as follows: the appellant company, which operated in the property sector, was convicted by the Provincial Court of Cáceres of an offence of fraud and sentenced to a fine of 24,000 euros and the temporary closure, for six months, of the office from which it operated.
The same judgment sentenced the owner of the estate agency and one other person to two years’ imprisonment for the same offence, committed by charging a double commission on the transaction—to the buyer and to the seller—without the knowledge of those affected; that sentence has now been reduced to one year’s imprisonment.
In its appeal, the convicted company alleged that its rights of defence had been infringed because it had not been formally accused in the proceedings, having learnt of its involvement through a statement of provisional conclusions, without its legal representative having been heard during the criminal investigation.
The Supreme Court’s ruling
The Supreme Court begins its reasoning by noting that the judgment of 26 February 2016—which immediately precedes the judgment discussed here—contains seven separate opinions, demonstrating the need to accept that there are disputed issues concerning the criminal liability of legal persons. It is therefore advisable not to interpret the solutions put forward to date by the Supreme Court, the State Prosecutor General’s Office and legal scholarship itself as definitive solutions requiring no further qualification.
In this regard, it is important to emphasise that the judgment under examination was delivered unanimously by the judges comprising the Chamber and therefore contains no separate opinions.
The judgment then sets out one of its principal arguments: that a legal person enjoys the right to the presumption of innocence. However, the judgment does not stop there, but reinforces its argument by stating that “the body of rights which a legal person may invoke, deriving from its procedural status as a defendant (…) cannot differ from that enjoyed by a natural person accused of committing an offence”, albeit, of course, with the necessary adjustments arising from its particular status as a legal person.
This unequivocal assertion is then given specific expression in the statement that legal persons enjoy the right to the presumption of innocence, the consequence being that, as with natural persons, the burden of proving the commission of the offence rests upon the prosecution.
At this point, it should be recalled that the commission of offences by legal persons has a particular structure under Spanish law, since it requires: first, that the offence has been committed by one of the persons referred to in Article 31 bis of the Criminal Code; and, secondly, that the natural person was able to commit the offence because of a structural defect in the mechanisms for preventing the commission of offences required of every legal person, this requirement having been defined much more precisely since the 2015 reform of the Criminal Code.
In connection with the foregoing, the Supreme Court rejects any interpretation whereby, once an offence has been committed by one of the natural persons referred to in Article 31 bis, corporate liability may be inferred by means of a presumption iuris tantum. The judgment firmly rejects the existence of two standards governing the Public Prosecutor’s conduct, one requiring the criminal liability of the natural person to be established beyond any doubt, while that standard is lowered for legal persons once the liability of the natural person has been established. Accordingly, establishing criminal liability is the same and requires the same evidential effort whether the accused is a natural or a legal person.
Compliance programmes
In relation to the grounds excluding criminal liability referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 31 bis, the judgment states that, irrespective of how those grounds are classified, “whether they are regarded as grounds exempting from punishment, grounds excluding culpability or, as has even been argued, negative elements of the offence, the controversy over the doctrinal label cannot determine the procedural status of collective entities as a distinct and separate subject of criminal accusation”. Thus, insofar as the structural defect in management, monitoring and supervision models aimed at preventing the commission of offences constitutes the basis of liability for a corporate offence, the applicability of the principle of the presumption of innocence requires the Public Prosecutor to establish the existence of a serious breach of the supervisory duties which the company should have implemented but which have not been implemented effectively. This clearly does not prevent the legal person from availing itself of whatever evidence it considers appropriate to demonstrate its proper operation and its commitment to compliance with the law.
Failure formally to accuse the legal person
In the proceedings concluded by the judgment discussed here, the representatives of the legal person convicted by the Provincial Court of Cáceres alleged in their appeal on points of law that its rights of defence had been infringed by the failure formally to accuse the legal person subsequently convicted.
In determining this ground of appeal, the Supreme Court applies the criteria established in the paragraphs examined above, which lead to the conclusion that, in offences committed by legal persons, a conviction may be based only on a prior finding, as a proven fact, of a criminal act attributable to the legal person itself.
This is because our criminal justice system cannot accommodate forms of strict liability whereby the act of one person—the offence committed by one of the persons referred to in Article 31 Bis of the Criminal Code—may be transferred to another, in this case the legal person. The judgment of 29 February 2015 is cited here, stating that \»… the system of criminal liability of legal persons is based, following prior verification of the commission of the offence by a natural person belonging to the organisation as the initial prerequisite for such liability, on the requirement to establish and properly apply effective control measures which prevent and seek to avoid, insofar as possible, the commission of criminal offences by those belonging to the organisation. […] Thus, the determination of the conduct of the legal person relevant to establishing its criminal liability […] must be based on an analysis of whether the offence committed by the natural person within it was made possible, or facilitated, by the absence of a culture of respect for the law as the guiding principle of the conduct of its organisational structure, independent of that of each of the natural persons comprising it, which should manifest itself in specific forms of monitoring and control of the conduct of its managers and hierarchical subordinates, aimed at preventing them from committing the offences listed in Book II of the Criminal Code as possible antecedents of such liability of the legal person \».
In view of the foregoing, given the failure formally to accuse the legal person and to establish the existence of the requirements for its conviction under the interpretation of the rules laid down by the Criminal Code concerning the criminal liability of corporate entities, the Supreme Court ultimately allows the appeal on this ground and acquits the legal person prosecuted.
Conclusions:
Of the matters examined in this judgment, we wish to highlight the following points:
– Any conviction of legal persons must be based on the non-negotiable principles underpinning criminal law.
– The body of rights which a legal person may invoke, deriving from its procedural status as a defendant, cannot differ from that enjoyed by a natural person accused of committing an offence.
– The Supreme Court rejects any interpretation whereby, once an offence has been committed by one of the natural persons referred to in Article 31 bis, corporate liability may be inferred by means of a presumption iuris tantum .
– Insofar as the structural defect in management, monitoring and supervision models aimed at preventing the commission of offences constitutes the basis of liability for a corporate offence, the applicability of the principle of the presumption of innocence requires the Public Prosecutor to establish the existence of a serious breach of the supervisory duties which the company should have implemented but which have not been implemented effectively. ©LOYRA ABOGADOS 5 April 2016 Article also published in CINCO DÍAS