Gaming & Gambling

The DGOJ 2015 Annual Report

Carlos Lalanda ·

The DGOJ 2015 Annual Report

 As happens every year, we must consider the data in the Annual Gambling Report in their proper perspective.

In the recent 2015 Annual Report, the Director General for Gambling at the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations (MINHAP) is right in the first paragraph of the introductory letter to his recent Report: he presents us not so much with the Annual Report on Gambling in Spain, but above all with an exhaustive Report on his Directorate General, whose 58 civil servants “worked their fingers to the bone” during the 2015 financial year and whom it would certainly not be appropriate to criticise here.

However, it is also customary for this Annual Report to include and describe the gambling market in Spain through facts and figures, serving as a reference for numerous press reports, studies and analyses of this economic sector.

Why, then, are errors and omissions repeated year after year, when it would be desirable for the Administration to provide objective and reliable data in order to obtain an approximate picture?

They probably go back a long way, but it is worth reviewing the causes.

The State's “there and back” powers in gambling matters.

The transfer of powers by all the Autonomous Communities (CCAA) in relation to games of chance—all of them assumed without exception—cannot amount to a complete abandonment of the subject by the State. This is not a consequence that can be inferred, in any field, from our constitutional model, so disparaged today for the current distribution of powers. Other, more rational interpretations are possible. In gambling matters, after the final transfers had taken place and before the enactment and implementation of Law 13/2011, the Central State's activity in this field had been confined to authorising the operation of gaming machines on vessels that could not be attributed to a single Autonomous Community, and also, residually, to the remote management of gambling in Ceuta and Melilla, which was ultimately, through a legislative sleight of hand, finally “transferred” to the Autonomous Cities. It appeared that the State was indeed “abandoning” its power to intervene in games of chance.

Following the entry into force of Law 13/2011, the State had to reactivate, at great speed, a body to exercise powers over online gambling and betting, activities which by definition do not take place within a specific territory, but within a “personal” sphere, since they involve direct marketing between the entities offering them and individuals, with no intermediate physical manifestation beyond networks, cables, and personal computers or mobile telephones.

Apart from certain manifestations whose classification is doubtful and which would appear to revert to regional competence (“regional online gambling” or “State-level land-based online gambling”), the State's powers and functions in relation to games of chance also include the unexpected regulatory intervention function in relation to lotteries, following the privatisation of their provision through SELAE, without counting the exceptional regime of ONCE, which remains a “State phenomenon” but is excluded from Law 13/2011.

And the body responsible for exercising these powers ended up, at the expense of the Ministry of the Interior, within the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations, in the Directorate General for the Regulation of Gambling (DGOJ). It therefore seems clear that this is the most suitable body within the Administration to gather information and communicate gambling market data, either because it can obtain them directly (online gambling within its competence) or because, as would be desirable, it could collect them from the public or private entities that hold them.

The State's competence to gather information and compile statistics.

Among the provisions “forgotten” in day-to-day work is Organic Law 9/1992, of 23 December, on the transfer of powers to Autonomous Communities which attained autonomy by means of Article 143 of the Constitution, which remains fully in force in two respects of current relevance: it established the Sectoral Conference (on gambling), a matter we shall leave for another occasion; and, as regards the matter now before us, it laid down the “Forms of control” over the powers transferred to the CCAA in its Title III.

These include two essential obligations of the CCAA receiving the powers: to provide the information requested by the State Administration, and to maintain the level of effectiveness existing at the time of the transfer. The sanction for failure to comply with these obligations is extremely severe: the Government may first issue a formal requirement to the Autonomous Community and, if the failure subsequently persists, may even suspend the powers and services, notifying the Cortes Generales, and may go so far as to revoke the exercise of the transferred power.

The CCAA should therefore provide data and information, and according to the Report, not all of them do so, or they do not do so adequately; this explains some of the glaring omissions of information highlighted in the DGOJ 2015 Report itself in relation to certain CCAA. Do they not possess the data? Are they unwilling to report them to the DGOJ? Neither excuse is tenable in view of the requirement laid down in the Organic Law.

It is clear, on the other hand, that the DGOJ's “functions” do not include an obligation to issue an Annual Gambling Report, so that, in the absence of resources or information, it could refrain from preparing one. However, we have been arguing that the State always retains competence over “statistics for State purposes” (Article 149.1.31 of the Spanish Constitution (CE)) and that there would therefore be no obstacle whatsoever—quite the contrary—to gathering information from Public Administrations, and even from citizens or businesses, in order to produce a genuine and effective “Report on Gambling in Spain 2015”.

Data by sector: highly inadequate and unreliable

Even before the DGOJ existed, criticism was levelled at the inadequate source of information for much of the published data, or at the methodology used. Let us now analyse the weaknesses that recur year after year after year.

State gambling. SELAE and ONCE are entities which, by virtue of their direct relationship with the State Administration, are obliged to submit data and information on their activities, whether by rendering accounts to the Protectorate of the Ministry of Health (ONCE), or by having their accounts audited for their sole shareholder, the State (SELAE). Accordingly, and despite an evident delay, these have always been the most “reliable” and detailed figures. However, this section still lacks certain figures relating to SELAE which form part of its day-to-day activity and may appear marginal: on the one hand, sales made through websites other than SELAE's own; and, on the other, the volume of sales surcharges received by the numerous private entities which thereby manage to sustain or supplement their activities (bars, associations, schools, political parties, etc.).

Casinos. The figures in this case are provided by the Directorate General of Police, which retains its former power to gather data in its supervisory capacity. However, since gaming table data are measured in terms of “DROP” (a formula which is not equivalent to the total stakes placed), they cannot be harmonised with the figures for other forms of gambling, where these are known more accurately. For example, the volume of stakes in land-based casinos is far greater than that of all online gambling, yet no comparative estimate with other forms of gambling is ever produced.

Gaming machines    The source of the data in this case is the Autonomous Communities, although the method they use to obtain them is unknown. This is one of the greatest uncertainties that has recurred year after year, without anyone having truly explained whether the data are directly sourced or estimated. Someone will have to address this.

Nothing was said in 2015 about the segment involving the operation of gaming machines in gaming halls, an omission which business operators in this sector have rightly taken the opportunity to criticise.

Bingo halls. Although this information appears to come from CEJ, a comparative analysis of the figures published by this business association nevertheless shows that they do not match those of the DGOJ exactly. It is the CCAA that should provide accurate information year by year, since they collect this information in the tax returns submitted by business operators for the prior purchase of bingo cards.

Online gambling This is the clearest and most reliable source of information, since it should pass through the DGOJ's own computers in the exercise of its inspection and supervisory functions. Hence this is the chapter containing the greatest wealth of detail and breakdowns in the entire Report. This information is already reported quarterly in the successive Reports on online gambling. In this case, the only objection is that its integration into the overall data in relation to other forms of gambling is limited.

Land-based betting Although this sector has been growing in recent years, and is authorised and operating in almost all the Autonomous Communities, following a separate trajectory from online betting, there is scarcely more than an occasional indirect reference to it.

Gambling taxes. One of the chapters forgotten by the Gambling Report … How much do gambling operators pay in specific gambling taxation? Do the CCAA not provide information? Does the DGOJ not have information on the amounts collected from State-level online gambling? Which forms of gambling contribute the most tax? To take a simple example, the revenue from the Gambling Levy on traditional bingo is six times the revenue collected from all forms of online gambling and betting.

It is absolutely essential for an Annual Report to include this parameter, in detail, since it is one of the contributions to society that distinguishes this sector from other economic sectors.

The economy and employment rates generated by games of chance  A basic or elementary Annual Gambling Report should also give some idea of the size of this economy in relation to other sectors, and of its employment rates. It is all very well for us to know how many civil servants serve in the Directorate General for Gambling and their grades, but a basic or elementary Annual Gambling Report should also give some idea of the size of this economy in relation to other sectors, the investment it provides, or its employment rates.

It therefore seems necessary to supplement the Report published by the DGOJ with other public and private studies.

Carlos Lalanda Fernández

Loyra Abogados

Madrid, 5 July 2016

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