Gaming & Gambling
Extremadura Law 7/2018 on large leisure facilities: (“PRIVI”LEGIO)
Carlos Lalanda ·
Extremadura Law 7/2018 on Large Leisure Facilities (self-styled in the official gazette itself as “LEGIO”) has been published in the D.O.E. of 6 August and subsequently in the Official State Gazette (BOE). This requires us to take stock of this and other similar previous initiatives which envisaged the possible establishment of large casino complexes in Spain.
A shower of millions, a shower of jobs, a shower of hopes.
The archetype of the sirens’ songs, which drove those who heard them mad, is repeated. A universal symbol immortalised by Homer in Ulysses’ Mediterranean odyssey. And now, in Extremadura, whose mythology also features, incidentally, malevolent sirens, albeit freshwater ones[1].
Leisure complexes, or casino complexes for foreigners?
The legislation enacted is indeed surprising. First, because not only the Explanatory Memorandum, but also the operative provisions (Article 1, paragraph 2), state that this new Law is intended to regulate Large Leisure Complexes (hereinafter, “GIOs”) primarily aimed at the “international family leisure market”.
What model is envisaged? ….. Theme parks with casinos added? … Las Vegas, Nevada, USA?… Are there too few Spaniards to fill these complexes, or are we insufficiently attracted to these offerings, so that they will have to turn to an international clientele?
All previous similar failed attempts which included significant legislative reforms were based on one central idea: people normally travel across the world to visit theme parks, and not solely and exclusively to gamble in casinos, and this phenomenon is more closely linked to tourism and families than to inveterate gamblers, who tend to be in the minority.
This was the case from the first one that comes to mind, the “Reino de D. Quijote” in Ciudad Real, Spain’s least populous provincial capital, where at least an international airport was planned; but subsequently also in Los Monegros (Gran Scala), Madrid (Eurovegas), and Catalonia (BCN World). All had the same ending: the flight of the promoters of the “song”; at least, in the last-mentioned case, after the customary flight, they managed to persuade one of them to participate in a much smaller final legislative version which was certainly, indeed, “complex”.
All of them referred to an “international” family clientele who would flock to the leisure facilities and, perhaps, visit the casino in passing (the adults in the family, of course).
The legislative premise described” (“international clientele and/or for casinos”), imagined in Extremadura, is highly inconsistent with the experience of such projects worldwide, because this new offering cannot be built from nothing, without international transport infrastructure[2]; moreover, as casino experts warn, the offering is normally built on “local” demand[3].
Models developed on this premise and in the image of Las Vegas which have enjoyed some success are few, such as Atlantic City (an adult offering, close to major US cities); Macao (an adult offering, a casino tradition, and access to the large neighbouring Chinese market); or Singapore, with a more mixed offering, mass tourism and extensive infrastructure, and the world’s best airport. We shall see what happens in Massachusetts.
The idea of building, (from “nothing”) a new “Las Vegas”, Nevada, USA, in Extremadura seems, at the very least, chimerical.
But this is a preliminary and intuitive assessment, shared by many. Let us turn to an analysis of the content of the Law, beyond Article 1.
The content of LEGIO
In view of the foregoing, a considerable effort is required to continue analysing the Law.
In most of its articles following the first, admittedly, a considerable effort can be seen to remedy the difficulties inherent in Spanish planning law when large privately initiated land developments are proposed, which State law has scarcely managed to overcome through the numerous successive Land Laws, repeatedly constrained and curtailed by judgments of the Constitutional Court (TC), owing to the distortion arising from the powers of the Autonomous Communities in this area within their respective territories. At present, given its extreme complexity, only specialists and the “initiated” achieve a degree of understanding of the obligations which prospective developers must bear.
Hence the efforts of the Extremadura legislature to simplify and redirect this planning labyrinth are commendable, and may be regarded as a truly mythical task (this time that of Hercules).
It principally establishes a special and exceptional planning regime for GIOs, in relation to the obligations to prepare Development Plans, the preparation of environmental reports, and the definition of special rules concerning planning implementation obligations, as well as the time limits for administrative procedures; and so on at considerable length. The Law devotes, exhaustively and in detail, its first 10 articles and its last 4, out of a total of 15, to this,
These rules on GIOs may apply to any activity, and not only to casino complexes. Such is the wording of the Law and the assessment of the Council of State, which the Assembly consulted, and whose Opinion has not been officially published, making direct consultation of it very difficult (see this link). It states that this is not a \»Special-Purpose Law\» directed at a specific developer, which was what the legal counsel to the Junta had sought in initiating it.
It devotes only one article specifically to casinos, Article 11, and certain other essential special provisions, as well as the two Additional Provisions which we shall examine.
In general, significant requirements are laid down for the development of GIOs, namely:
- A minimum area of 300 hectares, of which the developer must have “effective ownership-based” availability of two thirds, which does not clarify whether title to the land may be shared. (In the initial Bill, the area was 1,000 hectares)
- A minimum investment of EUR 1,000 million.
- The creation of at least 2,000 direct jobs (it does not specify whether full-time, permanent or temporary, part-time, etc.).
- The creation of 3,000 hotel accommodation places.
- Tertiary, public-facility and residential land uses, with a maximum residential use of 20%
- The dedication of 10% of the land to preserving native biodiversity.
- A minimum provisional security of EUR 10 million.
- Project implementation: 5 years.
- In addition, constant reference is made to Corporate Social Responsibility plans, in a context of modern corporate compliance.
If we then examine each article, however, we find numerous qualifications entailing limitations or exceptions to the foregoing requirements. For example, the assumption of numerous typical planning obligations to carry out works or to compensate or rehouse persons whose property is compulsorily acquired or who are evicted; the final security will be equivalent to 2% of the value of the detailed implementation project (that is, at least EUR 20 million if the minimum investment is EUR 1,000 million); 30% of the dwellings must be subject to the officially protected housing regime; the creation of a Social Sustainability Fund of at least EUR 3 million annually. And so on at further considerable length.
The initial wording included certain questionable matters which were flagged by the Council of State in its Opinion, some of which were taken into account in the wording enacted: the application must not be required in \»paper\» format; and certain other procedural matters required under the Law on Procedure; or the requirement for certain more exhaustive environmental reports; however, no correction has been made in response to the warning concerning the authorisation holder being permitted to be the beneficiary of compulsory acquisition of transport or electricity networks, a status reserved for undertakings in those respective sectors.
The Council of State overlooks, or \»tiptoes around\», other matters because the Opinion was not mandatory, and the consultation concerned only a limited perspective, the powers of the Autonomous Community of Extremadura in relation to those of the State over the matters covered by the Law. It thus reaches the conclusion, obvious for present purposes, that the Extremadura Assembly has the power to regulate casinos and the taxation of casinos. We shall now examine how it does so.
The special PRIVI-LEGIO regime, if there are casinos.
It has been said, but subsequently also denied, that this legislation was promoted as a consequence of a specific and concrete proposal involving hotels and casinos, put forward by a developer in a particular area of Siberia Extremeña[4].. And we have already said that, as drafted, it could be directed at anyone.
Thus, in the “hypothetical case” that these complexes are to include gambling casinos, whether or not in Siberia, we find a few provisions, clear and concise, which establish significant privileges and exceptions in relation to the general regulatory regime for these games, which is currently very detailed in Extremadura. We may therefore list the following variations:
- No public tender is required for the grant. (For example, if there are two or more applications for G.I.O.s, there could be casinos in all of them). An open offering.
- No additional procedure is required for casino authorisation beyond the procedure for the G.I.O. itself. ( First Additional Provision). Although the G.I.O. procedure requires the “other documentation provided for in the casino regulations of Extremadura” (Article 4.2 n)
- The authorisation is for 25 years, renewable for successive equal periods indefinitely. (Article 11.3)
- Unrestricted opening hours ( Article 12)
- The partial assignment or transfer of the casinos of a GIO is permitted, which presupposes that there would be several (Article 11.4). Although it immediately goes on to state that the assignor (the GIO holder) will be jointly and severally liable for the assignee’s gambling and tax obligations.
- Preferential treatment in special taxation (Second Additional Provision.1), in principle 15%, but in practice 3%; see the comments on this below.
- All games included in the Catalogue of Games of Extremadura may be operated (this appears to be the intended meaning of the reference to Article 8 of the Law in the First Additional Provision of LEGIO).
All of this constitutes a genuine regime of “privilege” in relation to the current regulations and the casino currently authorised.
Even so, it does not reach the extreme of the Madrid case, where a specific administrative body was also established to oversee these complexes, or a regime allowing unrestricted gambling loans.
Nor is everything advantageous compared with the ordinary regime; there are other provisions on casinos scattered throughout the articles which may give prospective developers some cause for concern:
- They remain subject to the Casino Regulations, at least as regards pre-opening checks and supervision, inspection and control (that is, the penalty regime); and also to the security requirements, which will be additional to the security mentioned above ( 11.1).
- Share capital of EUR 600,000 is required for each casino applied for ( 4, 2 n).
- The revocation of GIO status on grounds of lapse could occur in the event of a gambling infringement (of any kind, even a minor one), since this is what is required as a condition for its grant (indirectly, 13, b)
But, of course, the foregoing special rules appear to be intended solely for casinos operating within these GIOs, since it is not stated that any of them, other than the general tax rate, extends to casinos currently operating in Extremadura[5].
This was not exactly the case in the previous failed projects. Normally, rules, including statutory burdens and limitations, apply equally to everyone, whether they are many or few. A distinction in the application of the Law is permissible only in very well-reasoned cases, where such inequality has a very clear and non-distortive justification. Otherwise, we would be, and are, facing a genuine “Privilege”. Rules are “general”, not “individual”.
We have nevertheless already seen that the Council of State, restricting the subject matter of its analysis in its Opinion, concludes that this is not a \»Special-Purpose Law\»; and, furthermore, that the Autonomous Community has the power to amend the regime governing casinos or their taxation.
One of the key elements of the distinction advocated by this LEGIO is special taxation, applied differently to casinos within a G.I.O. and those outside them, within Extremadura itself.
Specific taxation, a genuine “record” (“low”)
The Second Additional Provision establishes a tax rate of 15% in respect of games in “gambling casinos”. This clause takes effect immediately, for all casinos currently existing in Extremadura or developed in the future within GIOs, without exception. This is consistent with the legislative powers in tax matters which allow the Extremadura legislature to establish the rate and the amount of tax payable by casinos in the case of the special Gambling Levy.
Generally, this percentage applies to the revenue obtained after paying prizes to winners, and in particular to casino table games.
It is uncertain, and clarification would be advisable, whether this proportional charge will apply to games other than table games, which appear to be those referred to in the cited subparagraph d), since those other games are subject to different rates and charges (for example, type C machines, bingo and betting).
We are pleased to agree with the Extremadura legislature that it is much more appropriate for the conduct of a casino business that the revenue of these establishments, whether from casino games or otherwise, be taxed at 15% in every band of gambling revenue[6]; and we would add that its complete abolition is desirable, as is indeed the case for any other lawful leisure services undertaking in Extremadura. Ordinary taxation, direct or indirect, already exists to contribute to meeting general public expenditure.
However, Paragraph 2 of the new Additional Provision added to the Legislative Decree on taxation in Extremadura which is enacted includes, and only for casinos within GIOs, a “deduction” of up to 80% for 25 years from all gambling tax liabilities (here, undoubtedly, including those relating to casino table games or other games), corresponding and equivalent to the sums invested in the initial construction of the complex and the equipment in its facilities.
It is true that neither the value of the land nor the annual contributions to the so-called “sustainability fund” may be included in this deduction, but in practice it means that, for taxation under all heads of the Levy, its rate is 3% (20% of 15%), that is, the current record low rate for this tax.[7]
In short, an effective rate “never before seen” in Spain……. And one which will not apply to “casinos under the general regime”, such as the one currently authorised in Badajoz.
This latter inequality may very probably be regarded as discrimination prohibited by the Constitution, even though the Council of State \»has not seen it that way\» because it has not analysed it from this perspective; moreover, in these cases it affects the very dynamics of business competition. Some have sought to regard this tax discrimination as genuine “State aid” prohibited under EU law (a paradox of language, since the “aid” comes from an Autonomous Community); but there are already precedents in other areas of taxation in Spain which were classified in this way.
It would have sufficed for this reduction to apply to “all” casinos, including those outside GIOs, which will thus have to compete in this market at a disadvantage for 25 years, even jeopardising investments already made. On this point, we are clearly facing a genuine “privilege”.
The political colours of the proponents.
From another, broader analytical perspective, those who succumbed to the sirens’ songs were governments of every political colour (Bono’s in Castilla La Mancha, or Marcelino Iglesias’s in Aragón, through to Esperanza Aguirre’s in Madrid, or first Artur Mas’s and then Puigdemont’s in Catalonia).
One thing has nothing to do with the other.
Nor, therefore, does it in Extremadura.
Madrid, 20 August 2018
Carlos Lalanda Fernández
Loyra Abogados
[1] See the case of the siren of Garrovillas, in the Tagus
[2] In Extremadura, the only airport in service operates domestic flights, in Badajoz, with little traffic, and is shared with a military air base. It has nevertheless been said that it has one of the longest runways in Spain.
[3] In a broad and generous sense, local demand for casinos/leisure consists of the pool of potential customers within a specific physical radius. See the “bathtub theory”, presented as a mnemonic by W, Thompson at the Conference on Games of Chance in Spain (El Escorial. 1997). In his presentation, he used a bathtub diagram to illustrate how economic concepts flow in these activities. There must be a minimum, constant flow of “local” customers for the business to be viable, with those arriving offsetting those leaving..
[4] Numerous news reports include this location, supplied by the Extremadura Government; but this is also what has subsequently been expressly denied, according to evidently contradictory reports.
[5] The Gran Casino de Extremadura in Badajoz is currently open to the public, having been authorised in 2005, and, according to Rodríguez Ibarra himself, opened with an investment of EUR 35 million and the creation of 350 jobs. http://www.elperiodicoextremadura.com/noticias/extremadura/gran-casino-extremadura-espera-recibir-70-000-clientes_183135.html
[6] Until this Law, 15% applied only to the band up to EUR 2 million; thereafter, 30%, 40% and even 50% in the highest bands.
[7] It is also true that this is not the historical record, since in Madrid the first version of the Adelson Law included a similar concept, which reduced the effective rate to 1%.