Gaming & Gambling

Highly Confusing Agreements in the Canary Islands

Carlos Lalanda ·

Only yesterday, in another article, I examined the promising agreed interpretations of two recent Gambling Laws, in Asturias and Illes Balears, from the perspective of the Law on the Guarantee of Market Unity (LGUM). The advances that may benefit businesses in the gambling sector by reducing regional administrative barriers concerning security deposits, professional cards, or registration in Registers are already perceptible.

The faltering and timid initial application of the LGUM to gambling sector Legislation is beginning to bear some fruit through the use of the Bilateral Cooperation Commissions comprising representatives of the State Administration and of each of the Autonomous Communities (CCAA).

It should be recalled that these Bilateral Commissions have an important Constitutional role (Art. 33 of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court (LOTC)), and operate as preliminary moderating forums for reaching agreement and resolving potential Conflicts of Competence, seeking within them to arrive at interpretations consistent with the Constitution in order to avoid bringing the Conflict before the Constitutional Court.

Where a consensual solution cannot be reached, there is no alternative but to resolve the disagreement through constitutional proceedings, with the uncertainty this entails and the delay of a judgment that will be delivered several years later.

The disagreement concerning the Canary Islands Law

In this case, the State decided to initiate proceedings concerning the recent Canary Islands Law 9/2014, of 6 November, on Tax, Administrative and Social Measures, considering, insofar as is relevant here, that it might give rise to a conflict on two separate grounds: first, by creating in its Additional Provision 12 (DA12) a Surcharge on Gambling Tax in its online form; and second, by establishing restrictions on the games of chance that may be installed in catering establishments (Seventh Final Provision, partially amending the Canary Islands Gambling Law).

Both conflicts were brought to an end by respective Agreements adopted by the Bilateral Commission, published by Resolution of 5 June 2015 and Resolution of 10 June 2015.

And both are highly confusing and difficult to understand.

The Agreement on the Gambling Tax Surcharge. (Canary Islands Official Gazette (B.O.Can.) of 22-6-2015),

The Canary Islands Measures Law (DA12) approved a Regional Surcharge of between 1% and 4% in addition to the State tax liabilities, applicable to almost all the taxable events for Gambling Tax contemplated and established in Art. 48 of Law 13/2011 on the regulation of gambling (online forms), which in turn provides for possible regional surcharges of up to 20% of the established rates, initially ranging from 25% on Win to 22% on gross stakes, depending on the case.

Its entry into force was implicitly envisaged for the day following its publication in B.O.Can., namely 11 November 2014, also in accordance with the general rules on the entry into force of laws in the Law on Administrative Procedure (LPAC) and the Civil Code.

Yet the Agreement of the Bilateral Commission reaches the absurd conclusion that this Provision and Surcharge will only take effect when the“agreements corresponding to the institutional frameworks for cooperation on regional financing” are approved, and after the“legislative amendments necessary for its configuration and full application as an assigned tax” have been made. A genuine muddle which appears to mean the following: wait for a new Organic Law on the Financing of the Autonomous Communities (LOFCA) to be approved (which, incidentally, is being considered by the Cortes Generales), and then for their inclusion in the amendment to be made to the Law on the Assignment of Taxes to the Canary Islands (plus the corresponding implementing Decrees concerning the administration of assigned taxes, etc.), which is what happened when the Fiscal Levy on Gambling was assigned to the Canary Islands.

This presupposes that the Gambling Tax of 2013 is a tax distinct and separate from the Fiscal Levy on Gambling, which is certainly a considerable presumption. For the taxable event contemplated in Law 13/2011 is exactly the same as that established under the name of Fiscal Levy on Gambling since Royal Decree-Law 16/1977 and subsequently reiterated and amended in numerous State Laws. In my opinion, this “new Tax” is merely one of the specific manifestations of the old one, and its application would require, at most, implementing regulations establishing the rules for “apportionment” merely outlined in the State Law “creating” it, but which do not encroach upon any State competence.

It should also be recalled that there have already been numerous instances of “Surcharges” on the Gambling Levy applied to machines, bingo, casinos, etc., and the Constitutional Court (TC) raised no objection to them.

And the clear evidence that this form of “Gambling Levy”, namely the “Tax on Online Gambling”, is fully in force without the need for new LOFCAs is that Gambling Tax revenue is routinely remitted and transferred by the State to the Canary Islands and other CCAA in the ordinary course on a quarterly basis, and has not prevented the establishment, with considerable difficulty, of a system of “apportionment” based on the percentages of players residing in the Canary Islands which is technically open to criticism, certainly, but real and effective.

In short, to prevent constitutional proceedings from being commenced, the choice has been made to interpret, by mutual agreement, that DA12 has not yet entered into force. In other words, for the time being, there is no Canary Islands Surcharge.

It would be necessary to examine whether the powers of these Commissions extend to substituting themselves for the will and authority of an entire Parliament, including the decision on the entry into force of the legislation it approves.

The Agreement on “online machines or terminals” (Official State Gazette (BOE) of 19-6-2015).

In this case, in its amendment of the Gambling Law, the Measures Law introduces new wording concerning the necessary prior administrative authorisation to be granted by the Government of the Canary Islands for matters relating to the operation of gambling and betting, whether land-based or remote, in physical establishments (Amending Art. 6.3 of the Gambling Law), I have highlighted the term “physical establishments” in bold because it is new and because the second paragraph of this Art. 6.3 is retained to regulate “interactive systems based on electronic or computer communications”, the operation of which “may only be undertaken by operators expressly authorised by the competent Regional Ministry, on the terms determined by regulations”. This is contradictory in its own terms because ……..

is the subject matter regulated in the first paragraph not the same as that in the second, namely administrative intervention in this activity in establishments open to the public?

does the Law intend, through this new wording, to regulate what Canary Islanders do in their homes, on their mobile phones, PCs or tablets?

could the second paragraph even refer to operators holding a State licence, who would in turn require some form of regional licence?

To this initial, somewhat confusing amendment is added new wording for Art. 17 of the Canary Islands Gambling Law (“catering establishments” such as bars, cafés, restaurants and similar establishments”), which this time clearly determines that only type “A”, Special A and B gaming machines and betting terminals may be installed in them. For the new wording adds that “no other type of gambling or betting, whether land-based or remote, in any of its forms, may be operated or conducted in those establishments.”

At first sight, it appears intended to prohibit roulette, blackjack or bingo, but also the sale of ONCE games, SELAE lotteries and all kinds of terminals for online forms of gambling, which are those determined by State Gambling Law 13/2011, but which would also include lottery terminals.

Several provisions similar to this one were included in regional Gambling Laws and have given rise to numerous interpretations and disputes as to their compatibility with gambling and betting of a State nature and subject to State authorisation, such as those conducted by SELAE and ONCE, as potentially encroaching upon State competences in relation to the conduct of this class of gambling. No definitive solution was ever reached in constitutional proceedings.

In these circumstances, the State alleged a possible encroachment upon its competences in the Canary Islands under the banner of the recent LGUM, from the perspective of an infringement of its Article 20 (effectiveness of administrative acts throughout the national territory)

The Agreement adopted by the Bilateral Commission in this case gives weight to this provision, but ultimately refers expressly only to so-called “online machines or terminals”, which must be authorised provided they comply with the technical specifications laid down in the Canary Islands gambling regulations governing type “B” machines. It states that regional administrative authorisation is then not required “for the circulation of online machines or terminals”. It is understood that State authorisation would suffice in this case.

Yet another tongue-twister or verbal muddle, because there is no legal mechanism governing the “circulation of machines” in the Canary Islands, and in any event it appears that we are not dealing with a problem of type approval of those terminals (which would not be required in the Canary Islands), but rather of “installation authorisations” (as required for type “B machines).

But on examining this Agreement more closely ….

why does it refer only to terminals similar to type “B” machines and not to others?

should it also include SELAE terminals for Lotteries or football pools?

should it generally refer to all types of terminals, whether for games such as bingo, roulette, blackjack or machines with prizes, with State authorisation?.

The difficulty, once again, of understanding the true meaning of the Agreement and its consequences requires us to delve somewhat deeper into the matter.

The installation of terminals for “online type B machines of chance” is currently unfeasible in the Canary Islands.

As I shall endeavour to explain, the Central State’s interest in initiating the Conflict on this ground has “Freudian” connotations

First and foremost. The characteristics of machines of chance authorised for State online operators, as matters stand today and with the State Regulation governing “online machines of chance” to hand (Order HAP/1370/2014, of 25 July), impose a clear limit on their application in the land-based sphere: according to its title and definition, it regulates the game of “machines of chance “ (“chance” highlighted in bold); and as regards its “ancillary physical terminals”, these may only be installed “in those physical locations where regional legislation permits the game governed by these basic regulations”(Art. 10 of the Order). In other words, the State legislation has delimited or restricted the installation of these terminals, probably out of respect for the exclusive constitutional competences of the CCAA expressly recognised by the Law. It is difficult to understand why the State now alleges an “encroachment upon competences”.

Second: Moreover, in the game of “machines of chance”, the Order does not distinguish any classification into categories “A”, “B, or “C” (it refers simply to machines “of chance”).

And this necessarily leads us to the following question: what are “machines of chance”?

Although a degree of uncertainty remains, the legislative concept of machines of chance throughout our country, forged in our recent history, corresponds to type “C” machines. This is how machines offering games of chance with random prizes, or even prizes determined by “statistical” cycles, are defined; whereas type “B” machines are, for the time being, characterised principally by “programmed” prizes with low maximum amounts and a very small stake. The former may normally be installed only in casinos and on ships, as is the case in the Canary Islands.

Many Machine Regulations, including the State Regulation of 1998 which remains in force today, made a clear distinction: type “A” or amusement machines; type “B or amusement machines with programmed prizes; and “Type C machines or machines of chance”

With this legal regime perfectly delimited today, it seems inappropriate for the State to allege an encroachment upon competences when the State Law and Order themselves are the legislation underpinning the restriction on installing ancillary terminals for “online machines of chance” in catering establishments in the Canary Islands, since the installation of machines of chance, namely type “C” machines, in these establishments is not permitted in the Canary Islands.

In short, either the Order and the State Law must change, or the Agreement must be declared unfeasible.

Second Agreement: Unanswered Questions

Ultimately, the question to which all the foregoing appears to lead us is the following:do “type “B” machines of chance” really exist? Here we arrive at a genuine terminological contradiction with no clear answer. A paradox contained in this cryptic Second Agreement.

There are many other doubts that plunge us into a sea of confusion and questions which warrant exploration:

  1. Does the Agreement apply to type “C” online terminals? On the one hand, a simple extrapolation from what has been agreed may sustain and support the possibility of type approval for online machine-of-chance games, with ancillary terminals having characteristics similar to those established for type “C” machines, such as the “C” machines in the Canary Islands. For installation in Casinos, for example.

There would be no impediment, since the Canary Islands Law does not seek to impose any limit in this respect. However, in this case the uncertainty concerns whether an installation authorisation is required, as for any other “C” machine that may be installed in the Canary Islands, or whether exemption is plausible, as in the case of “B” machines in catering establishments. From this perspective, that of carrying on the activity, the LGUM refers to the requirements of the place where the service activity is carried on or to which it is directed, according to reports issued by the Ministry’s own Single Market Secretariat. Consequently, the regulatory intervention regime for type “C” online terminals (as for the hypothetical “B” online terminals) could only be one of prior authorisation, because that is the position in the Canary Islands. In other words, the opposite of what the Agreement appears to say.

  1. Does the Agreement apply to State lottery terminals? They are certainly not mentioned, so this would again be an extrapolation. However, in this case the Canary Islands Autonomous Community’s exclusive competence over gambling includes lotteries, as they are listed in the Catalogue of Gambling and Betting, and the Statute of Autonomy excludes only Charitable Sports Pool Betting (football pools, for example). Consequently, the restriction in the Canary Islands Law in its new Article 6.3 (the requirement for prior regional authorisation) appears to affect possible Lottery terminals, whether belonging to SELAE or ONCE, where they are to be operated in physical establishments (at least catering establishments, which are the subject of the Agreement). In short, a glaring omission from the Agreement in this case, if the true intention was to provide cover for the installation of lottery terminals falling within State competence.
  2. Finally, nothing is said about online betting terminals, which are nevertheless also covered by the Canary Islands statutory provision approved, listing the forms permitted in hospitality establishments. What happens to them? This question and oversight, as in Groucho Marx’s famous phrase, could only be resolved by referring to Art. 17, and referring back and returning to the confusing Second paragraph of Art. 6.3 of the Canary Islands Law.

In summary, an attempt to resolve two Conflicts, concluded with Agreements strewn with mines.

23 June 2015

Carlos Lalanda Fernández.

Loyra Abogados

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