Gaming & Gambling
Independence in Catalonia and Gambling (II)
Carlos Lalanda ·
Catalonia’s Autonomous Community Law 20/2017, of 8 September, declares the Republic of Catalonia and, irrespective of the problems arising from its entry into force and effectiveness (immediately suspended by the Constitutional Court (TC), automatic effectiveness conditional upon the outcome of the Referendum called under Law 19/2017), brings nothing new as far as the gambling sector is concerned. At most, and to draw a purely linguistic parallel, as some have characterised it, its enactment has triggered something akin to a game of chance known in literary terms as “Russian roulette”.
We are therefore in the same situation as I described in the article of July 2015, which I reiterate in its exact terms.
“Independence in Catalonia and gambling. A genuine business risk
I have not seen any comment or a single public statement about the effects on the economic sector of games of chance of a hypothetical secession of Catalonia, advocated and recently formulated as a near-term political objective by certain political and social sectors, and the milestones of which appear to be materialising.
Neither in the documents circulating in the mainstream media in Spain or Catalonia, nor in the international media.
Not even in the gambling trade media, so dynamic and so closely informed of everything that happens.
Nor a single reference or statement by the political or administrative authorities responsible for gambling, outside or within Catalonia, expressing a view on this eventuality (perhaps one, in passing). It is even striking that, in all the forums where the application of the Market Unity Law is being debated, not a single word is said about the possibility of an independent Catalan Republic, the realisation of which would point towards the very opposite of what that Law (LGUM) seeks to achieve.
What would happen in that scenario, and how would it affect those involved in operating games of chance in the hypothetical event that Catalonia’s secession were to be accomplished? What effects would it have on businesses, players and the Government of Catalonia?
Although it is a risky exercise, I shall attempt to analyse some relevant legal aspects.
Catalonia’s current powers in gambling matters.
Catalonia’s current powers in gambling matters are extremely broad, both as regards intervention in business activity and its specific taxation, and even from the perspective of the Generalitat as a lottery “undertaking”.
The Statute of Autonomy of 2006 contains the most advanced forms of competence anywhere in Spanish territory, unmatched by other Autonomous Communities. Even after a slight interpretative “adjustment” to Article 141 by the TC, it confers “exclusive” competence in this area where the gambling activity takes place exclusively in Catalonia. It also provides for the possibility of intervening in the creation or modification of new State-level games through the Reports of the Bilateral State–Autonomous Community Commission. It is true that the Constitutional Court judgment reduced the decisive nature of these Reports (leaving this prerogative as a “light veto”), but in practice this capacity to moderate State rules has never been exercised, either in the regulation of new online games or in the modification of some existing ones.
Under the Statute of 1979, the Catalan Gambling Law of 1984 was the first to be enacted anywhere in the State, even before the State’s own Gambling Law. It is true that it was subsequently patched up and later had to be supplemented by a Catalan Law on Sanctions. And that it may be considered technically incomplete when compared with other, much more detailed Autonomous Community Laws. But it has served its purpose, and the specific regulations for each game have been developed extensively and distinctively. The latest example is the recent Decree 163/2015, which takes the opportunity to amend many aspects of administrative intervention in several of them. In short, broad freedom to intervene.
There have been interesting constitutional disputes over competence concerning very specific aspects of this sector of activity, brought by the State or by Catalonia, resolved in most cases in favour of a very broad interpretation of these exclusive powers, to the point that the TC’s judgments may be regarded as “generous” towards the Autonomous Communities in general. In short, intervention without restrictions.
On the other hand, the rules relating to the EAJA, created in the image and likeness of the State’s LAE, are in a legal limbo arising from the Generalitat’s status as both a gambling operator and a public body, and its difficult accommodation within the EU legal order; a limbo which the State’s LAE shared, but which has been partly resolved because SELAE is now a public limited company and its monopoly operation is endorsed by Law 13/2011.
Finally, as regards the specific taxation of gambling, the Fiscal Levy imposed on gambling businesses, although a State tax, has been devolved and almost all its tax elements are at the disposal of the Autonomous Communities, including the taxable base, rates and amounts payable, and, above all, its administration and collection have been assigned to them in full. Even in relation to online gambling, the Gambling Levy, although collected by the Central State, is remitted quarterly to Catalonia in the form of a cheque in proportion to a figure more or less equivalent to the number of resident Catalan players.
The legal system envisaged in an independent Catalonia
The various analyses and Drafts undertaken by several Technical Groups in Catalonia, tasked with preparing different draft rules to underpin a new Independent State, say nothing about the position this sector of the economy would occupy within the general framework sustained by a new Catalan Constitution resting on the pillars of any State: a territorial basis and the political allegiance of its citizens.
Thus, everything is hypothetical, but logic suggests that, if the scope for intervention in gambling business activities is currently virtually unlimited and has been extensively exercised by the Generalitat of Catalonia, and there are also no outstanding disagreements with the Central State, any new model should rest on foundations very similar to the present ones, without major upheavals.
As regards the supply of gambling by businesses, once the model of intervention has been defined (greater, lesser or similar to the present one), the scope for deciding what aspects of this business activity to regulate and how should probably be very similar to that currently in force.
In terms of the rules applicable to individuals, however, the new legal regime must determine, and it remains to be seen, how Catalan citizens’ right (to gamble) will be configured. In other words, whether it will fall within the sphere of freedoms, whether it will be permitted or prohibited, in what circumstances, etc. In general, the new Catalan Republic would have to formulate a new body of Civil Law (or expand its own) and, in particular, establish the rules governing gambling contracts; but also any administrative or criminal restrictions within the context of a new Criminal Code or body of rules on sanctions, the text of which is unknown to us. To give a practical example, it is necessary to determine whether a Catalan may purchase foreign lottery tickets, or whether online gambling may be offered to Catalans from abroad.
In tax matters, virtually anything is possible: continuing with the framework which is currently entirely State-based, or radically altering it, depending on the various tax milestones. From the perspective of the taxation of gambling businesses (gambling levy), logic suggests that the current model, with its virtues or defects attributable to the Catalan legislature, would be reproduced, given its present almost total rule-making power over the various tax elements. But the taxation of players (principally personal income tax (IRPF), to give another example) would have to be defined anew.
Lastly, predicting now whether tax revenue following these changes will be higher or lower overall and in all the direct or indirect areas affected is a task which, in the absence of any indication, is more properly left to specialists in crystal balls. The same applies to predicting the other side of the coin, namely whether the tax burden will be higher or lower than it is now.
In any of the above cases, new Laws on games of chance, foreseeably the same in some matters or sectors, and susceptible to change, indeed profound change, in others. Unknown as matters stand today. Facing an interim period of uncertainty. Or, as it is beginning to be euphemistically termed, facing a “period of disconnection”.
Are we facing a business risk?
I leave a much more substantiated and detailed answer to the relevant economic assessors in specialist risk departments and teams, both outside and within Spain, who are already beginning to offer their opinions on economic matters in general concerning this uncertainty, which is increasingly taking shape.
I do venture to agree with many of them that we are facing a risk for gambling businesses, insofar as uncertainty becomes established in the economic and business landscape. In all sectors, and not only in the gambling sector. To look no further, for the implementation of the substantial investments expected in the context of the tender for casinos in Vilaseca and Salou.
But also for some of its forms which currently extend beyond Catalonia’s territorial boundaries, such as online gambling or national lotteries, whose player pool is decisive for the success of games of chance. Sooner rather than later, and from the perspective of the new State being envisaged, it will be necessary to determine the rules linking State-level online operators with Catalan citizens, or to exclude the latter from the State-wide pool; with the difficulties we already know in implementing the so-called “common pool or shared international liquidity”. Or also to determine the position of SELAE and ONCE Agents in Catalonia.
Another associated risk arises in cases of games with shared pools extending beyond an Autonomous Community, such as the recent interconnected electronic bingo games or jackpots spanning several Autonomous Communities. A matter which, hypothetically, would have to be the subject of an International Agreement.
Lastly, there are differing opinions as to the possible benefits or detriments for companies based in Catalonia, whether Catalan-owned or not, with a significant business presence outside Catalonia, including many in the gambling sector. And as to the possible psychological reactions of customers or users outside Catalonia. No certainty as to their magnitude, but certainly a risk, in the broadest sense of the term.
In short, unknowns and risks far more important than those associated with the recent developments and changes arising from the recent Autonomous Community elections, which are bringing about the replacement of several former regulators and the arrival of new ones. Something that is arousing so much anticipation and is concerning some analysts.
Madrid, 23 July 2015.”
Today.
Since July 2015, Catalonia’s exclusive powers over intervention in gambling matters have been exercised normally, as, for example, in the recent case of the restriction to a single operating company for the operation of gaming machines in hospitality establishments (Autonomous Community Law 5/2017); or its powers over devolved taxes, increasing the Gambling Levy applicable to gaming machines (e.g. 1,005 euros quarterly for type “B” gaming machines).
Furthermore, uncertainty about companies’ interest in participating in the tender for casino authorisations in Vilaseca Salou was partly dispelled by its award to a North American group; although the investment has yet to materialise.
There have been several skirmishes surrounding the LGUM, and it was precisely the challenge brought by the Catalan Parliament that led to the annulment of several articles of that Law which could indirectly be relevant to this sector, including the one described as creating the “single State licence” for business activity, applicable to any administrative sector.
As regards “Catalans’ pockets”, an interesting and revealing figure from 2016 in the area of commercial competition between lottery monopolies: La Grossa, in the absence of official figures from the EAJA, caused Catalans (the only people who, by definition, may play La Grossa) estimated “losses” (the difference between stakes and prizes) of some 4 or 5 million euros; whereas, through SELAE’s Lotería Nacional, they obtained prizes of more than 1,100 million euros, with a positive balance (“winnings”) of 460.5 million euros. (Data from the Directorate-General for the Regulation of Gambling (DGOJ), sourced from SELAE). Food for thought.
Madrid, 10 September 2017.
Carlos Lalanda Fernández