Gaming & Gambling
The judgment on the LEVY during the state of alarm
Patricia Lalanda, Fernando Martín, Carlos Lalanda ·
We have recently learned of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 January 2024, the first of the many appeals on points of law lodged in relation to the Fiscal Levy on Gambling, as applied to gaming machines (fixed amounts), during the period of the state of alarm declared to combat Covid 19 in 2020. The appeal was lodged against an earlier judgment dismissing the claim by the High Court of Justice (TSJ) of Castilla y León.
The operating company sought a proportionate refund of the fixed amounts paid in the 4th Quarter, following the entry into force of Decision 78/2020, of 3 November, of the Junta de Castilla y León, which declared alert level 4 throughout the Autonomous Community, with restrictions on opening hours and capacity in public establishments, including those in which these machines were operated. The Decision was issued in the context of the 2nd state of alarm, declared by the National Government in Royal Decree 926/2020, which imposed the Autonomous Communities' “co-governance” regime to mitigate the aforementioned pandemic.
The assessments paid had been upheld at the assessment stage, and a proportionate refund had been refused, as it was subsequently in the economic-administrative proceedings and in the judicial proceedings before the TSJ of Castilla y León, since all the decisions adhered to the literal wording of the taxable event for the Gambling Levy: the machines held authorisations, and the tax accrued in full even though the activity for which they were authorised could not be carried on fully.
We must look closely at the origin of the claim because, whether through bad luck or poor litigation strategy, the first appeal to reach a judgment on points of law, which will probably determine the case-law doctrine in subsequent judgments, is precisely the most “doubtful” case that could have been brought.
It is not the same to bring a claim where the Autonomous Community has partially restricted opening hours and capacity in hospitality establishments (which is what happened under that Decision, in Q4), as to do so in respect of the situation during the first State of Alarm, when the complete closure of establishments was ordered for a specific period (which is what happened from 14 March 2020 to 4 June 2020).
My view is that claims should not have been brought in respect of these highly doubtful quarterly periods, but that the challenge should instead have focused on the first ones (that is, on the Levy for the First and Second Quarters of 2020), where the true scale of the problem arising, and continuing to arise, under the current regulation of the Gambling Levy would have been evident.
The social reality at the time the rule is applied
The text governing the taxable event and the taxable person (which applies to all forms of gambling), and which has not been amended in any way since then, is Article 3 of Royal Decree-Law 16/1977, of 25 February:
“First. Taxable event.–The taxable event shall consist of the authorisation, conduct or organisation of games of luck, wagering or chance.”
Viewed from a broader perspective, it seems to us that the judgment overlooks one of the elementary principles of statutory interpretation under our Civil Code:
“Art. 3.- 1. Rules shall be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of their words, in relation to their context, historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the time at which they are to be applied, having primary regard to their spirit and purpose.
The social reality at the time Royal Decree-Law 16/1977, now 47 years old, was enacted was radically different from that of today:
- All gaming machines were prohibited under criminal law unless they were authorised (a situation that continued until 1983). The taxable event referred to a “legal” event that was essential at that time: any game of chance that a company wished to conduct had to be authorised; however, the levy also applied to unauthorised games, as is logical, and there are many examples.
- The Royal Decree-Law referred to a “Fee”, which the Constitutional Court (TC) subsequently took it upon itself to identify as actually being a “Tax”.
- The tax rate was proportional to revenue.
Much has happened since then, in tax practice and the tax system, and in the business sector concerned with the operation of gaming machines. To set out a few milestones:
- The Spanish Constitution was adopted in 1978.
- The first Provisional Regulations on machines were adopted in 1979.
- The application of fixed annual amounts (rather than proportional amounts) to gaming machines was introduced in 1980, following the first Regulations, with an amount of 6,000 pesetas for type B gaming machines, increased in 1982 to 40,000 pesetas and to 125,000 in 1983.
- The Autonomous Communities were created and constituted, and powers over taxes such as this one were allocated and devolved to them (except, incidentally, the elements relating to the taxable event and the taxable person).
- As regards games of chance themselves, these were decriminalised in 1983.
- The TC established in its case law, from Constitutional Court Judgment 126/1987 onwards, that this was not a “Fee” but a tax, and indeed a “Direct Tax” levied on the profits of operating companies (of the same nature as, for example, Corporation Tax (IS), or the Tax on Economic Activities (IAE)). The first Supreme Court judgments followed this approach, clarifying that it was a “so-called fee” (that is, a “Fee” which purports to be one but is not).
- In all the Autonomous Communities granting the regulated authorisations, there are “administrative fees for processing authorisations”, which are indeed genuine fees, the amount of which is also determined in regional laws.
However, none of this background or these clarifications regarding the nature of the tax has served to determine the judicial decision discussed here.
The interpretative exercise undertaken by any Court should not merely consist of resorting to a plain and simple literal reading of the rule, but should place it in its present context and interpret it using the factual material of today, rather than that of the past.
The key to the interpretation in the judgment under analysis lies in its Fourth Legal Ground: “The Chamber's interpretative approach. Fiscal Levy on Gambling. Nature, taxable event and accrual”. In it, although it is acknowledged, as the TC has stated since its Judgment 126/1987, that the taxable event can only be linked to an actual business activity, the Supreme Court now reaches the opposite conclusion, namely that the taxable event “is not linked to the actual operation of the machine and the consequent intention to derive income from it, but to the granting of the authorisation permitting its operation” (pp. 33 and 34). A considerable step backwards in interpretation.
In short, the Court has treated the matter as though it involved an “administrative fee for authorisation”, which is precisely what the TC and the judgments following that constitutional doctrine had ruled out ……. Why still resort to a strictly literal reading instead of adopting the TC's approach? Why not, in a case as doubtful as this, refer a question of constitutionality that would have clarified whether the text still in force today might be contrary to the Constitution?
We shall never know, nor has the Court attempted to find out. Ultimately, we are facing a step backwards in time, as though the judgment had been delivered in 1977. A truly archaic and obsolete interpretation.
And there is little further the appellant can go. The reasoning underlying the dismissal in the judgment cannot be described as unreasonable or manifestly erroneous (rather, “outmoded” or “outdated”), which are the grounds that could support access to a possible appeal for constitutional protection before the TC, so that, in my view, this avenue offers little scope.
Is the IAE not the same as the Gambling Levy?
Furthermore, we consider it equally open to criticism that the Supreme Court does not adopt an interpretation allowing the claim similar to that which it recently adopted regarding the proportionate disapplication of the IAE to activities affected by the State of Alarm, in its judgments of 30 May 2023 . Those judgments conclude that, since the IAE is a direct tax (like the Gambling Levy) imposed on the carrying on of an economic activity, even though it accrues annually (like the Gambling Levy in Castilla y León), the temporary closure in 2020 of the establishments where the activities were carried on prevented profits from being earned (just as when a proportionate refund of the Levy is sought); and that, ultimately, the fixed amount (like the Levy applicable to gaming machines) can be “apportioned” in proportion to the time during which the activity could be carried on. On this latter point, the Supreme Court does not agree.
The only difference relied on by the Supreme Court, and the reason why it refuses a proportionate refund, as it did with the IAE, is the existence of a “regulatory provision”, the Instruction governing the Tax, which provides for a reduction in the amount payable where industrial activity is halted, thereby permitting “proportionate apportionment”, whereas no such provision exists for the Gambling Levy. The Court overlooks the fact that this “reduction” operates not because the IAE Law says so, but because of the inherent logic of the principles arising from the Spanish Constitution (CE) concerning taxpayers' economic capacity. The Levy is of the same nature as the IAE: a direct tax on business profits. With or without a “modulating” Instruction, the Supreme Court should have recognised, through a “present-day” interpretation of the antiquated wording of the taxable event for the Gambling Levy, that a proportionate refund of the amount payable was likewise appropriate.
The legislative amendment of the taxable event for the Levy remains outstanding.
The need to “amend” the Fiscal Levy on Gambling, or rather the “taxable event”, regrettably “petrified” since 1977 and unaffected by the important milestones noted above, has long been advocated in numerous forums.
Since the 1980s, following the constitution of the Autonomous Communities and the adoption of the Autonomous Community Financing System, all elements of the tax, including legislative powers, have gradually been devolved, with the exception of the regulation of the “taxable event and the taxable person”. In other words, the Autonomous Communities have been unable to change anything in this respect; only the Central State can do so.
In this context, what incentive is there for the State to amend these principal elements if it “has no interest whatsoever in doing so”, and collects nothing from this Levy? Even for the latest variant of this levy, the Tax on Gambling Activities applicable to nationwide online gambling, it was decided to “transfer” or “remit” the revenue collected to the Autonomous Communities through the simple convention of referring to the parameter of total bets according to the bettors' place of residence”.
Unfortunately, in this scenario, we can only observe, once again, that “something must be done, but no one dares to do it”. The judgment discussed here has shown that not even a Supreme Court attached to stale literalism has made way for an interpretation more closely aligned with constitutional reality.
Reference to possible “State liability for legislative acts”. Background and requirements.
Curiously, the judgment discussed here refers to the possibility of bringing claims arising from being taxed and paying tax despite earning no returns within the framework of an action for “financial liability of the Administration” (p. 40’). Most probably because the judgment of the TSJ of Castilla y León already referred to it, or perhaps because the appellant had mentioned it.
For our part, we had even been invoking this avenue since 2020 in a prescient article on this particular issue, since, as a last resort, a refund of the levies that had to be paid could be sought through this avenue if it was not obtained through the tax claim.
However, a few months ago, the Supreme Court itself already set the course of refusing compensation on the grounds of State liability for legislative acts arising from the orders in the Decree declaring the state of alarm, suspending all manner of activities, in its judgment of 31 October 2023, on the grounds, in short, that these were general burdens that could not fall within this form of compensation. That judgment was delivered in a case concerning a hospitality activity, although its reasoning could and will be extended to any other activity similarly suspended.
The indirect avenue of compensation on the grounds of liability of the Administration (or of the State as legislator), distinct from a tax claim, had already operated in numerous earlier judgments when the supplementary charge on the Fiscal Levy on Gambling for 1990 was declared unconstitutional (e.g. Supreme Court Judgment of 19 December 2000. ). In many cases, the Supreme Court upheld claims for State liability for legislative acts, where the action was brought within one year of the judgment declaring unconstitutionality (Article 142.5 of the then applicable Law 30/1992, LPAC).
We are now facing a different milestone and grounds different from those involved then; and this would only be admissible if the entity subject to the tax had submitted its claim within the statutory time limit for challenging the states of alarm (that is, one year from the end of the first state of alarm, before the Council of Ministers), or from the end of the Decisions under the second state of alarm, before the Government of the Autonomous Community). This was, incidentally, the recommendation we made in our earlier commentaries.
Thus, although in such a case the Supreme Court would have to overcome its own contradictions in order to rule in favour of a refund … why not try if, as I said, it has been requested “within the time limit”?.
Madrid, 21 March 2024.
Carlos Lalanda Fernández