Gaming & Gambling
“Late, badly and never”. On the Judgment of the National High Court of 8 March 2018
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Comments on the judgment of the National High Court of 8 March 2018.
A recent judgment of 8 March 2018 of the National High Court concludes, for now, litigation concerning Decree 55/2015 of the Council of the Valencian Government, which approved the Gaming Halls Regulations, and declares Articles 4.1, 9.2 b) and 9.3 null and void, which made the opening of a new gaming hall conditional upon its being situated more than 800 metres away from another hall already authorised.
The appeal upholds the appeal brought by the State Legal Service on behalf of the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), which had previously warned in an earlier Report that this restriction could infringe Law 20/2013 on the Guarantee of Market Unity (LGUM). The previous Decree 44/2007 established a shorter distance of 200 metres.
The reasoning is that such a restriction on business activity is contrary to Art. 5 of the Law (LGUM), a provision which develops the “principle of necessity and proportionality” governing the actions of Public Authorities.
The aforementioned judgment may be challenged by an appeal in cassation before the Supreme Court, and it is very likely that one of the parties to the litigation has already attempted to do so.
Below we analyse several procedural circumstances emerging from a reading of the judgment and its background, and its foreseeable consequences. In short, we once again find ourselves faced with a situation very aptly represented by the popular saying: “late, badly and never”.
“Late”: Excessive length of the proceedings.
The judgment was delivered 3 years after the Decree was approved, and until it becomes final, a status it does not yet possess if the avenue of an appeal in cassation is opened, no immediate consequence is foreseeable. It will become final when the judgment in cassation is delivered, or even earlier if the appeal is declared inadmissible at the preliminary stage, which is very unlikely to occur unless there is a significant formal defect in the lodging of the appeal. And once it becomes final, since it concerns a provision of general application, it would also be necessary to wait for the Valencian Government to publish the outcome of the judgment in the Official Gazette of the Valencian Government.
In short, it would be at least 4 or 5 years after the approval of a rule that is null and void as a matter of law before the situation annulled by the Court is corrected. This is an excessive period for special and priority proceedings which the LGUM itself created by specifically amending the Law on the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (hereinafter LJCA), introducing an Art. 127 ter, with shorter time limits throughout and priority in the conduct of proceedings. This priority in the conduct of appeals is twofold, as it is superimposed on Art. 66 of the LJCA because the challenge concerns a provision of general application
Noteworthy peculiarities during the proceedings.
A reading of the judgment reveals certain points of interest which have influenced the decision and will determine the effects of the judgment. By action or omission.
- Omission. The State Counsel bringing the appeal on behalf of the CNMC did not seek the “automatic suspension of the rule”, as permitted by the new Art. 127 quater of the LJCA introduced by the LGUM itself, although it is true that the recent judgment of the Constitutional Court (TC) of 22 June 2017 qualified it on this point (“automaticity”, but ultimately at the Judge’s discretion). Such suspension would have minimised the possible subsequent (and now current) “effects” of the declaration of nullity.
- Omission The State Counsel forgot to include the “PRAYER FOR RELIEF” or specific relief sought in the statement of claim, although the Court remedies this glaring omission.
- Action. The Court ordered the “consolidation” of another appeal pursued by an entity with the same interest in having those articles annulled, this time by way of an ordinary appeal before the High Court of Justice of the Valencian Community (TSJCV). Such consolidation, provided for in the LGUM, is likely and possible where “only” matters relating to the LGUM are brought into issue, since otherwise such consolidation would not be possible.
- Action. The Court opened a debate on the possible impact on the proceedings of the recent judgment of the TC of 22 June 2017, which annulled several provisions of the LGUM. If the proceedings have continued and resulted in annulment, it is because the Article on which the judgment exclusively rests (Art. 5 of the LGUM) remained unaffected by the constitutional decision.
All the foregoing leads to the following: (1). The contested provision has remained in force during these 3 years, and will continue to do so until the judgment becomes definitively final, with all that this entails for hypothetical parties “adversely affected” by it; and (2) if the appeal in cassation is upheld, for the reasons I shall explain below, a challenge to the rule on grounds other than infringement of the LGUM will have been prevented.
Below I express my modest doubts and findings arising from the judgment, given that it was delivered in the context of a special appeal (that provided for in Art. 127 ter of the LJCA) which procedurally permits only grounds relating to infringement of the LGUM to be addressed.
The establishment of a system of minimum distances between premises is a restriction on a fundamental freedom, business activity. And it may be challenged before an “ordinary Judge and under ordinary proceedings”
The opening of a gaming hall constitutes a business activity which is, in principle, free; a freedom enshrined and guaranteed in the fundamental rules of the Constitution and the European legal order. And all the appellants and the respondent in these proceedings agree on this, whether they support or oppose the rule.
The nuances and disagreements concern the circumstances in which, and the extent to which, this freedom may be restricted, for one reason or another. There are precedents concerning restrictions on the granting of gambling authorisations which have been declared null and void for lack of justification in the very rule incorporating them into the legal order (for example, in Catalonia and its Gaming Halls Regulations).
Without resorting to the LGUM, and following the general course of proceedings, infringement of the principles and freedoms contained in the Spanish Constitution (CE) and the European legal order may be pleaded, without any need to resort to the LGUM. As the power to impose restrictions is normally conferred on the competent regional body by the respective regional Gambling Laws, the natural forum in which to challenge them is the High Court of Justice (TSJ) of the Autonomous Community, which reviews this administrative activity, and the standard of review lies precisely in another fundamental principle governing the actions of Public Authorities: the necessary and mandatory statement of reasons for Regulatory Provisions. The absence of justification or reasons for the restrictive system of distances, in accordance with “policies on the scale of gambling”, is precisely what the judgment under discussion has expressly established.
The conclusion reached by the National High Court is substantively the same as that which the High Court of Justice of the Valencian Community could, hypothetically, have reached in ordinary proceedings against the contested Provision, even “disregarding” the LGUM. And this appears to be what one of the claimants was attempting, with or without the LGUM, before its “natural Judge”, in proceedings which subsequently lapsed as a result of the initiative to consolidate the appeals.
Furthermore…. The system of minimum distances between gaming halls does not fall within the LGUM, and therefore cannot be included in proceedings conducted under the rules of Art. 127 ter of the LJCA.
The most important issue, therefore, is to analyse whether a restriction on authorisations may be brought within the LGUM on the basis of any of its provisions. In the special proceedings conducted under Art. 127 ter, the National High Court may examine only issues and infringements relating to the LGUM, and the CNMC in its initial Report prompting the action, and subsequently the State Counsel, attempted, with apparent success, to justify the action and the proceedings by reference to one of its Articles, Article 5.
And this procedural prerequisite was so necessary that the Court drew the parties’ attention to the existence of the 2017 judgment of the TC which annulled several articles of the LGUM, although not the aforementioned article, so that it bases its decision on the application of this provision and “only” this provision.
I have already argued in earlier comments that, in my view, the “LGUM does not serve every purpose”, and that in the field of games of chance its application is very limited, because within the European legal framework from which it is partly derived (the Bolkenstein Directive, Laws transposing Directives into Spanish law, etc.), games of chance are expressly excluded from this liberalising legal sphere (Art. 2.2 h). of Directive 2006/123/EC, Art. 2.2.h) of Law 17/2009).
It has also already been commented and argued that, even so, the gambling sector is not entirely excluded from the application of the LGUM, but that it applies in a different manner, closely related to the elimination of repeated administrative burdens and duplication borne by businesses across the 17 Autonomous Communities and their legal orders.
However, it is not within the scope of this LGUM to interfere with or influence planning powers (which restrict the freedom to conduct a business), which are normally provided for in the respective regional Gambling Laws, also in accordance with the CE. Where an infringement of these freedoms arises through excessive exercise of the special powers in this field, it is not because the LGUM has been infringed, but because the rules providing the legal basis for planning, or for the planning procedure, have themselves been infringed, and the Ordinary Court has jurisdiction to review infringements of this kind.
Art. 5 of the LGUM cannot be applied in isolation
The judgment relies on the application of Art. 5 of the LGUM and its reference to the concept of “general interest” contained in Law 17/2009, transposing the Bolkenstein Directive into Spanish law.
The crux of the matter is that a rule defining a “general principle” without substantive specification cannot validly be applied in isolation, because although general principles are a source of law, they must be supported by substantive rules giving them specific content. The principle of “necessity and proportionality is an “indeterminate legal concept” which requires supplementary support.
If the only rule cited is, by reference, Art. 3.11 of Law 17/2009, of 23 November, which determines what constitute “overriding reasons relating to the general interest”, the Court forgets (and the parties probably forgot) that this Law of 2009 does expressly exclude games of chance, as I have already stated.
I do not see the reasons why this initial exclusion, based precisely on the prior exclusion of these activities in the Bolkenstein Directive, may be overcome by the expansive application of a general principle formulated in the LGUM, without any further support in the remaining provisions referring to the “necessity” and “proportionality” of measures restricting the freedom to conduct a business.
Likewise, there are no reasons to apply many other articles of the LGUM concerning freedom of establishment (e.g. Arts. 17.2 or 17.3: declarations of responsibility, notifications) to gambling premises.
And thus, stripped of other articles, Art. 5 of the LGUM cannot be applied to this case. And in my view, the judgment has overreached and could be quashed by the Supreme Court on this point, although in that event with the paradox that the “ordinary challenge” could not be resumed, which would probably have led the TSJCV to the same decision (the nullity of the contested provision)
“Never”
To complete the reference to the popular saying, we analyse the effects and consequences that may arise in the short, medium and long term: probably none:
Effects of the judgment, if it becomes final. Correcting the legal order in this case will mean … automatically returning to the application of the rule under the previous Regulations, repealed by the new ones: Art. 4.1 of Decree 44/2007, the minimum distance of 200 metres for new authorisations (there may be differing views on this point: a complete absence of any restriction).
Furthermore, Art. 73 of the LFCA states that the nullity of a provision of general application shall not affect final acts adopted pursuant to it, which may not be reviewed. Accordingly, if an individual business operator has applied for authorisation and it has been refused through application of the aforementioned article, their argument can succeed only if they challenged it and it is still the subject of proceedings; lastly, the consequences are unforeseeable as regards recognition of a possible right to compensation, since this is not automatic in such cases. It is not even clear whether they could avail themselves of the legal mechanism known as the “extension of the effects of the judgment”, which the LGUM itself also extended to cases in this field, and they would therefore have to embark upon lengthy and uncertain proceedings for the financial liability of the Administration.
Foreseeable reactions on the part of the Valencian Administration
However, the judgment itself also expressly recognises the competence of the Valencian Community to regulate and impose certain restrictions (on the basis of Art. 11.7 of the Valencian Gambling Law), and even to impose minimum distances between halls “in accordance with policies on the scale of gambling”; it is therefore also very likely that there will be a further attempt to impose restrictions replacing those annulled, through new provisions even before the judgment becomes definitively final (a manoeuvre which is not uncommon in the gambling sector)
Conclusion.
The National High Court is probably correct in its diagnosis: we are faced with scant and insufficient justification for the regulatory restriction imposing a system of distances of 800 metres between gaming halls in the Valencian Community.
However, I consider the application of Art. 5 of the LGUM insufficient to substantiate the nullity of the provision; and as the National High Court should have refrained in these special proceedings from addressing matters other than those relating to the LGUM, I do not agree with the annulment on those terms.
Madrid, 6 April 2018
Carlos Lalanda Fernandez
Loyra Abogados