Gaming & Gambling

THE LESSONS OF MR. GREEN (2014 Measures on Online Gambling in the United Kingdom) PART TWO

Carlos Lalanda ·

We stated in the previous instalment that the issues addressed by Mr. Justice Green in his judgment of 10/10/2014 on the online gambling regime in the United Kingdom warranted detailed examination, both  for their clarity and forcefulness and for the possible comparison with the solutions offered by Spanish law on online gambling, principally embodied in Law 11/2013, of 27 May.

The importance and timeliness of basing licences to operate in online gambling on the “point of consumption”.

Entities and organisations based in Gibraltar, the Channel Islands, Malta, etc. connected with online gambling have flourished as this business has developed, attracted by the low taxation applied in those territories.  Classic “tax havens” in respect of taxes on profits and special taxes on gambling, with tax rates significantly lower than those in Spain (generally, 25% of the win) or Britain (15% of the win). A proposed increase from 1% to 10% in the colony of the Rock was swiftly abandoned, and the UK Government, aware that the excessive differential needed to be reconsidered, since according to some estimates more than £300 million in revenue was being forgone annually, undertook the amendment in 2013, which was approved in May 2014.  The 2005 Act allowed operators licensed outside the UK, in “White List” territories, to offer and conduct gambling with players located in the UK, without having to obtain a licence from the UK Gambling Commission, provided that no element of the system was located within the territory of the United Kingdom. As was to be expected, the largest gambling operators moved their technical and operational systems outside the UK, to the point of saturation in cases such as the Rock of Gibraltar.

Spanish legislation, much less liberal in the regulatory provisions applied to online gambling, had already adopted, in Law 13/2011 on gambling, a system better suited to “personal subjection” to the law: all Spaniards who enter into gambling contracts are subject to (Spanish) law, and therefore, conversely, all those wishing to offer gambling to Spaniards must be licensed in Spain. This general principle, expressly stated in the Law, is accompanied by another principle necessary to understand the system: operators licensed in Spain may also offer their games and open accounts for any foreign national; on the other hand, the Law says nothing as to whether all of them, Spaniards or foreign nationals, are subject to it “insofar as they are in Spanish territory”, which has given rise to various questions and uncertainties without a definitive answer. This is a system that truly revolves around the “point of consumption” or the recipient of the service, and which appears to be the system now adopted by the British Gambling Act 2014.

The importance of this entire circumlocution for the Spanish or British case, including Mr. Green’s reasoning in his judgment, lies in the tax implications of the matter: both in Spain and in the UK, the special gambling taxation of the place where the operator obtained its licence applies.  And online gambling operators, like any business undertaking ultimately, prefer the Gibraltar rate, for example, to that of the United Kingdom or Spain.

A large proportion of their profits is at stake.

But ….what does all this have to do with EU law, at which the United Kingdom so often “turns up its nose”?

It is true that, under the principle of freedom to provide services, the EU has made a considerable effort to remove barriers restricting the pursuit of cross-border business activities between EU countries, without forgetting that this and other Treaty principles are ultimately intended to serve European citizens, and that it is not merely a matter of benefiting businesses “for the sake of it”.  The so frequently invoked principle of freedom to provide services is inherently fundamental to activities conducted over the Internet, but it is subject to clear and evident restrictions in the field of gambling, which is almost invariably excluded from all manner of European harmonisation initiatives and which the EU institutions have always treated as an exception, with reference to the principle of “subsidiarity” (Member States remain sovereign in this area, and EU rules apply only in their absence), to the extent that gambling may be permitted in some States and not in others. The EU even permits, subject to various conditions, State monopolies in gambling, as an obvious exception to the freedom so frequently invoked.

So significant and distinctive is this exception that the first significant judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on gambling (the Schindler case) held that the prohibition on the sale of foreign lotteries in the UK, even lotteries authorised in other Member States, was compatible with EU law. Another notable exception is the exclusion of gambling-related activities from the scope of the Bolkenstein Directive, when that Directive is an attempt to give the fullest possible expression to the principle of freedom to provide services and to remove many of the national barriers imposed.

European case law, to which Mr. Green refers comprehensively and masterfully in his judgment (as a judge applying European law, which, moreover, is the position and recognised status of all judges in the Member States), has followed a lengthy doctrinal development, and gambling is defined as a business activity involving the provision of services which, as such, must enjoy freedom, but in respect of which national restrictions are permissible, provided that the restrictive measures are consistent with and proportionate to the aims they pursue, and ultimately serve the interests and protection of citizens. Hence the adoption, in this particular field, of recommendations aimed at protecting users and consumers of online gambling, to be followed by the national authorities regulating it[1] .

In his judgment, Mr. Green analyses all this in depth, dismissing point by point the submissions of the Gibraltarian claimant and its interveners, including the proposals under the so-called “passporting proposal”, a form of mutual recognition of licences which they sought and the admissibility of which the Court of Justice of the EU has repeatedly rejected[2]. Even the possibility of such “mutual recognition” within the framework of Gibraltar–UK relations is rejected, precisely because of the special nature of the regime governing their relationship..

Mr. Green insists that the measure adopted in the Act, ultimately the move to the “point of consumption” system and the requirement to obtain a licence in the UK, is neither disproportionate, discriminatory nor irrational. A true lesson and synthesis of European case law, examining the principal decisions of the CJEU in depth.

Thank you once again, Mr. Green, for offering us this erudite synthesis and reflection.

In the next and final instalment, we shall analyse whether this endeavour may be of use and transposed in any respect to the Spanish online gambling system.


[1] See the recent European Commission Recommendation on online gambling.

[2] E.g. the Stoss case, concerning the mutual recognition of national licences for online gambling.

Also published in AzarPlus

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