Gaming & Gambling

Monopoly against Monopoly

Carlos Lalanda ·

It is interesting to observe the relations of “friendship” between Lottery Monopolies such as SELAE, ONCE and EAJA, which are undoubtedly exacerbated by the issue of Catalonia.

For example, this week the press reported the complaint made by the Secretary for Finance of the Generalitat, who was also the chief executive of EAJA, because the Central Government  had vetoed EAJA's participation as an operator of Euromillones and Eurojackpot, in which SELAE and ONCE already participate as European operators respectively.

This is a veto similar to that imposed by Spain years ago on Catalonia's registration with the International Skating Federation. Obvious, evident, logical and natural, when someone tries to take some of your players away from you in a sporting competition.

A brief review of the respective regimes respectively applicable to SELAE, ONCE and EAJA allows us to compare, in general terms, the differences between them; and the reasons or lack of reasons for the “veto”.

SELAE AND ONCE

In the first group, at State level, SELAE is no longer a State administrative body, but a public limited company governed by Private Law which conducts a business, and whose sole shareholder, as of today, is the State. ONCE is somewhat more complicated, a Public Law Corporation overseen by the Ministry of Health. In the former, profits after tax are transferred to the General State Budget if it is decided to distribute them as dividends; in the latter, which is exempt from tax on profits, any profits would become part of its own assets, although ONCE normally incurs losses, which must be financed from that same General State Budget.

Lastly, both entities enjoy significant monopolistic privileges in their respective fields of activity, which sometimes overlap, and which are expressly set out in Law 13/2011 as a “reservation” for State lotteries, the former being historical in nature (a formal Monopoly since Charles III), and the latter arising from specific concessions (Agreements with the Council of Ministers since 1938).

EAJA

For its part, EAJA is an autonomous public body of the Generalitat, holding a “de facto” monopoly over Lotteries of a strictly Autonomous Community nature, a circumstance made possible by the lack of definition in the Catalan Gambling Law, and the lack of constitutional precision regarding competence over gambling and lotteries, and the consequent  occupation of this sphere by the Autonomous Community of Catalonia in successive Statutes of Catalonia and implementing Regulations on Autonomous Community lotteries. It must be said that this situation is replicated in virtually all Statutes of Autonomy  but no Autonomous Community other than Catalonia has developed this “Autonomous Community lottery monopoly”, apart from a few temporary or theoretical examples in the Basque Country and the Canary Islands, involving certain “instant lotteries”, and in Galicia, involving certain “video lotteries”.

As matters stand, and given the  monopolistic nature of lottery activities  within their respective spheres, it should come as no surprise that the Spanish State excludes or “vetoes” the presence of an operator other than its own in the lotteries subject to a monopoly. Not because there are political reasons or an attack on Catalonia, but simply because any monopoly, by definition, excludes competitors from the economic game.

The cake is divided up only once

It is absurd to think that if Euromillones or Eurojackpot could be purchased in Catalonia through EAJA, part of the proceeds from these lotteries in Catalonia would not be diverted  to EAJA to the detriment of the proceeds of SELAE's Lottery Agencies or ONCE's kiosks.

Pure logic. Had the manoeuvre of 2009, which temporarily secured Catalonia's membership of the International Skating Federation, been carried through, the Catalan Team would have recruited the best Catalan players, to the detriment of the Spanish Team …… or, in a Spain-Catalonia match, would the players common to both have played the first half for the Spanish Team and the second half for the Catalan Team?.

As I have commented on previous occasions, with another product launched by EAJA 2 years ago, la Grossa de cap d,any, a replica of the Gordo de Navidad, it is an established fact that some Catalan players who previously used the same money to buy tenths of tickets for the Gordo now spend less on State tickets, for one reason or another, as sellers in Catalonia clearly know.

In other words, the Catalan lottery cake cannot expand, whatever may be said, since Catalans' pockets cannot be endlessly plundered.

The veto is not political, but economic, inherent in any monopoly.

For many years, the operation of Lotteries has proved to be one of the facets or modes of exercise of any “constituted power”. It has been and remains one of its monopolies, like that of the application of the law and the use of force; although in this case it is a monopoly of an economic nature, as was the monopoly over trade in some of its many manifestations (the sale of tobacco, the sale of petrol, or trade with America or the East Indies).

One of the first consequences of the application of the Lottery monopoly in Spain (which was not even a “State” as we define it today) was the prohibition and punishment of the purchase of German Lottery tickets by Spanish subjects, by means of a Pragmatic Sanction of the Catholic Monarchs.

Hence any “veto” or prohibition is merely an expression of the monopolistic nature of the activity itself. The European agreement for Euromillones and Eurojackpot contains an express clause between the contracting parties, all of them owners of their respective National Monopolies, whereby they undertake to sell shares in tickets or tickets for these lotteries only to their own nationals, which would of course apply even to Internet sales. A genuine monopolistic division of the market.

But not out of patriotism or ideological considerations, rather for the same reasons as any economic monopoly: to maximise profit by restricting supply, so that no one encroaches upon the subject matter of its business activity, upon “its market”.

EAJA's monopoly in Catalonia, something unexplained.

Lastly, to this day there is still no rigorous analysis explaining the many unanswered questions surrounding this peculiar regional monopoly, whether from a legal or an economic standpoint.

From a constitutional law perspective, it is true that EAJA emerged and was established under cover of the “constitutional vacuum ” concerning the State's powers in gambling matters, but neither the Statute of Autonomy of 1979 nor that of 2006 said anything about possible Catalan Lotteries, referring only to gambling and betting. Even so, the Gambling Law of 1986 determined that lotteries could be included in the Catalogue, and the autonomous body EAJA was immediately established in 1986 as a commercial entity to manage the gambling and betting “reserved” to the Generalitat, without expressly mentioning lotteries. We thus see that there is no statutory conferral  of this monopoly. Indirectly, the Statute of 2006 recognises Catalonia's non-interference in the regulation of, and in, State-wide gambling and betting where these are entrusted to non-profit organisations with social objectives (read ONCE and, at that time, LAE)

Something similar occurs in the context of the EU, which Spain joined in 1986, when the entire body of rules under which gambling falls within the sphere of State sovereignty became part of the Legal Order, but where there is also a genuine aversion to monopolies of any kind …….how can the existence of an economic and  regional monopoly in this field be justified?. If we look at the examples of the Lotteries of the German Länder and those of the US States, it is clear that these regional monopolies have been established in the absence of a Federal Monopoly that would exclude them.

Furthermore, from this same legal perspective, the striking and constant production of regulations concerning EAJA's business activity is noteworthy: it has tried all kinds of “Lotteries”, including instant lotteries and variants offered through games that are lotteries in name only (e.g. “binjocs lotteries”), or which are marketed not through establishments open to the public in Catalonia, but through Catalans' personal devices. Moreover, these games and lotteries are often managed under an “assignment” arrangement, whereas the instrument establishing it stipulated that its activity would be carried out through “direct management”. In other words, an “expansive action” in the scope and development of the monopoly can be detected, which is difficult to justify. From an economic perspective, the operating accounts of the various Catalan lotteries are veritable mysteries, about which all the experts and financial controllers have complained on numerous occasions. These accounts are not exactly transparent. It is not known whether there are losses or profits, or what their true scale is. There are no audits, financial supervision or control bodies which at least publish data, even belatedly. This lends credence to numerous rumours about their use, or about the award of indirect management contracts. Certain estimates concerning la Grossa, for example, indicate either risks of loss, if the complete series are not sold and one of the players wins the main prize (which, fortunately for EAJA, has not happened so far), or a transfer of revenue to the detriment of the Gordo de Navidad, ultimately harming the General State Budget which, whether one likes it or not, also funds Catalan finances. In the Monopoly against Monopoly dynamic, virtually everything has been said. It was neither foreseeable nor to be expected that the Spanish State would surrender its share of the cake. The International Roller Hockey Federation authorised the Catalan Roller Hockey team, in its traditional discipline, to play provisionally in World Division “B” (a category  in which the Spanish Team did not participate), and it did indeed finish in first place, owing to its substantial pool of young talent in this discipline and the discipline's Catalan origins. The team was received in Catalonia with honours, but did not play a single match in the Main Competition. It was discovered that the provisional registration had been granted following certain suspicious semi-clandestine meetings with easily influenced officials of the International Federation. Shortly afterwards it was revoked.

Carlos Lalanda Fernández.

Founding Partner

Article also published in the leading gambling industry magazines: Sector del Juego, Joc Privat

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