Gaming & Gambling
Judgment of the National High Court (Administrative Division, Sixth Section) of 8 March 2018
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The Judgment of the National High Court (Administrative Division, Sixth Section) of 8 March 2018 concludes, for now, litigation concerning Decree 55/2015 of the Council of the Valencian Government, which approved the Regulations on Gaming Halls, and declares Articles 4.1, 9.2 b) and 9.3 null and void; those provisions made the opening of a new gaming hall conditional upon its being situated more than 800 metres from another hall already authorised.
The appeal upholds the appeal brought by the State Legal Service on behalf of the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), which had previously warned in an earlier Report that this restriction could infringe Law 20/2013 on the Guarantee of Market Unity (LGUM). The previous Decree 44/2007 established a distance of 200 metres.
The reasoning is that such a restriction on business activity is contrary to Article 5 of the Law (LGUM), a provision which develops the “principle of necessity and proportionality” governing the actions of Public Administrations.
Excessive duration of the proceedings. The judgment was delivered 3 years after the approval of the Decree, and until it becomes final, a status it does not yet have if an appeal in cassation is pursued, no immediate consequence is foreseeable. It will become final when judgment is delivered on the appeal in cassation, or even earlier if the appeal is declared inadmissible at the preliminary stage, which is highly unlikely unless there is a significant formal defect in the lodging of the appeal. And once it becomes final, since it concerns a provision of general application, it would also be necessary to wait for the Valencian Government to publish the outcome of the judgment in the Official Gazette of the Valencian Government.
In short, it would be at least 4 or 5 years after the approval of a rule that is null and void as a matter of law before the situation annulled by the Court would be rectified. This is an excessive period for special, priority proceedings which the LGUM itself created by specifically amending the Law on Administrative Jurisdiction (hereinafter LJCA), introducing Article 127 ter, with shorter time limits throughout and priority in the conduct of proceedings. This priority in the handling of appeals is twofold, as it is superimposed on Article 66 of the LJCA because the challenge concerns a provision of general application.
Noteworthy peculiarities during the proceedings. A reading of the judgment reveals certain points of interest which have influenced the decision and will influence the effects of the judgment. By act or omission.
- Omission. The State Counsel bringing the appeal on behalf of the CNMC did not seek the “automatic suspension of the rule”, as permitted by the new Article 127 quater of the LJCA, introduced by the LGUM itself, although it is true that the recent judgment of the Constitutional Court (TC) of 22 June 2017 qualified it in this respect (“automatic effect”, but ultimately at the Judge’s discretion). Such suspension would have minimised the possible subsequent (and now current) “effects” of the declaration of nullity.
- Omission The State Counsel forgot to include in the statement of claim the “PRAYER FOR RELIEF” or specific relief sought, although the Court remedies this glaring omission.
- Act. The Court ordered the “joinder” of another appeal pursued by an entity with the same interest in having those articles annulled, this time by means of an ordinary appeal before the High Court of Justice of the Valencian Community (TSJCV). Such joinder, provided for in the LGUM, is likely and possible where “only” issues relating to the LGUM are brought into contention, since otherwise such joinder would not be possible.
- Act. The Court invited submissions on the possible impact on the proceedings of the recent judgment of the TC of 22 June 2017, which annulled several provisions of the LGUM. If the proceedings have continued and resulted in annulment, it is because the Article on which the judgment rests exclusively (Article 5 of the LGUM) remained untouched by the constitutional decision.
All of the above leads to the following: (1). The challenged provision has been in force throughout these 3 years, and will remain so until the judgment becomes definitively final, with all that this entails for those who may have been “adversely affected” by it; and (2) if the appeal in cassation is upheld, for the reasons I shall set out below, any challenge to the rule on grounds other than infringement of the LGUM will have been prevented.
Below, I set out my modest doubts and findings arising from the judgment, which was delivered in the context of a special appeal (that provided for in Article 127 ter of the LJCA) in which only grounds relating to infringement of the LGUM may procedurally be considered.
The establishment of a system of minimum distances between establishments is a restriction on a fundamental freedom, business activity. And it may be challenged before an “ordinary Judge and through ordinary proceedings”. This is because the opening of a gaming hall constitutes a business activity which is, in principle, freely exercisable; a freedom enshrined and guaranteed in the basic rules of the Constitution and the European legal order. And all the appellants and the respondent in these proceedings agree on this, whether they support or oppose the rule.
The nuances and disagreements concern the circumstances in which, and the degrees to which, this freedom may be restricted, on one ground or another. There are precedents concerning restrictions on the granting of gambling authorisations which have been declared null and void for lack of justification in the very rule incorporating them into the legal order (for example, in Catalonia and its Regulations on Gaming Halls).
Without recourse to the LGUM, and following the general course of proceedings, infringement of the principles and freedoms contained in the Spanish Constitution (CE) and the European legal order may be pleaded. As the power to impose restrictions is normally conferred on the competent autonomous authority under the respective autonomous gambling laws, the natural forum for a challenge is the High Court of Justice (TSJ) of the Autonomous Community, which reviews this administrative activity, and the standard of review lies precisely in another fundamental principle governing the actions of Public Administrations: the necessary and mandatory statement of reasons for Regulatory Provisions. The absence of justification or reasons for the restrictive distance regime, in accordance with “policies on the scale of gambling”, is precisely what the judgment under discussion has expressly established.
The conclusion reached by the National High Court is substantively the same as that which the High Court of Justice of the Valencian Community could hypothetically have reached in ordinary proceedings against the challenged Provision, even “disregarding” the LGUM. And this appears to be what one of the claimants was attempting, with or without the LGUM, before its “natural Judge”, proceedings which subsequently lapsed as a result of the initiative to join the appeals.
The system of minimum distances between gaming halls does not fall within the LGUM, nor, therefore, may it be included in proceedings conducted under the rules of Article 127 ter of the LJCA. The most important consideration, since this is a special appeal by reason of its subject matter, is to analyse whether a restriction on the limitation of authorisations can be brought within the LGUM on the basis of any of its provisions. In the special proceedings conducted under Article 127 ter, the National High Court may only examine issues and infringements relating to the LGUM, and the CNMC in its initial Report prompting the action, and subsequently the State Counsel, sought, with apparent success, to justify the action and the proceedings under one of its Articles, Article 5.
And this procedural prerequisite was so necessary that the Court put to the parties the existence of the 2017 judgment of the TC which annulled several articles of the LGUM, although not the aforementioned article, so that it bases its decision on the application of this provision and “only” this provision.
I have already argued in earlier commentaries that, in my view, the “LGUM does not serve every purpose”, and that its application to games of chance is very limited, because within the very European legal framework from which it partly derives (the Bolkenstein Directive, Laws transposing Directives into Spanish law, etc.), games of chance are expressly excluded from this liberalising area of law (Article 2.2 h). of Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 2.2.h) of Law 17/2009).
It has also already been observed and argued that, even so, the gambling sector is not entirely excluded from the application of the LGUM, but that it applies in a different manner, closely related to the elimination of repeated administrative burdens and duplication borne by businesses across the 17 Autonomous Communities and their legal systems.
However, it is not within the scope of this LGUM to interfere with or influence planning powers (restricting freedom of enterprise), which are normally provided for in the respective Autonomous Gambling Laws, also in accordance with the CE. Where these freedoms are infringed through excessive exercise of the special powers in this area, this is not because the LGUM has been infringed, but because the very rules providing the legal basis for planning, or governing the planning procedure, have been infringed, and the Ordinary Court has jurisdiction to review infringements of this kind.
Article 5 of the LGUM cannot be applied in isolation. The judgment relies on the application of Article 5 of the LGUM and its reference to the concept of “general interest” contained in Law 17/2009, transposing the Bolkenstein Directive into Spanish law.
The crux of the matter is that a rule defining a “general principle” without substantive specification cannot validly be applied in isolation, because, although general principles are a source of law, they must be supported by substantive rules giving them specific expression. The principle of “necessity and proportionality is an “indeterminate legal concept” which requires additional support.
If the only rule cited is, by reference, Article 3.11 of Law 17/2009, of 23 November, which determines what constitute “overriding reasons relating to the general interest”, the Court forgets (and the parties probably forgot) that this Law of 2009 does expressly exclude games of chance, as I have already stated.
I do not see the reasons why this initial exclusion, based precisely on the prior exclusion of these activities in the Bolkenstein Directive, can be overcome by the expansive application of a general principle formulated in the LGUM, without any further support in the remaining articles referring to the “necessity” and “proportionality” of measures restricting freedom of enterprise.
Just as there are no reasons to apply many other articles of the LGUM concerning freedom of establishment (e.g. Articles 17.2 or 17.3: declarations of compliance, notifications) to gambling establishments.
And thus, stripped of support from other articles, Article 5 of the LGUM cannot be applied to this case. And, in my view, the judgment has overstepped the mark and could be quashed by the Supreme Court on this point, albeit in that event with the paradox that the “ordinary challenge” could not be resumed, even though it would probably have led the TSJCV to the same decision (the nullity of the challenged provision).
Effects of the judgment, if it becomes final. Correcting the legal order in this case will entail … automatically reverting to the application of the rule under the previous Regulations, repealed by the new ones: Article 4.1 of Decree 44/2007, the minimum distance of 200 metres for new authorisations (there may be divergent opinions on this point: a complete absence of restrictions).
Furthermore, Article 73 of the LFCA declares that the nullity of the provision of general application will not affect final acts adopted under it, which may not be reviewed. Thus, if an individual business owner has sought authorisation and it has been refused through the application of the cited article, their case can only succeed if they appealed and it remains pending in proceedings; lastly, the consequences are unforeseeable as regards the recognition of possible compensation, since this is not automatic in such cases. It is not even clear whether they could avail themselves of the legal mechanism known as the “extension of the effects of the judgment”, which the LGUM itself also extended to cases in this area, meaning that they would have to embark upon lengthy and uncertain proceedings concerning the Administration’s liability in damages.
Foreseeable reactions by the Valencian Administration The judgment itself expressly recognises the competence of the Valencian Community to regulate and impose certain restrictions (on the basis of Article 11.7 of the Valencian Gambling Law), and even to impose minimum distances between gaming halls “in accordance with policies on the scale of gambling”; it is therefore also highly likely that a further attempt will be made to impose restrictions replacing the one annulled, through new provisions, even before the judgment becomes definitively final (a manoeuvre which is not uncommon in the gambling sector).
Conclusion. The National High Court is probably correct in its diagnosis: we are faced with scant and insufficient justification for the regulatory restriction imposing a system of distances of 800 metres between gaming halls in the Valencian Community.
However, we consider the application of Article 5 of the LGUM insufficient to substantiate the nullity of the provision; the National High Court should have refrained in these special proceedings from addressing matters other than those relating to the LGUM.
This judgment may be appealed in cassation.