Gaming & Gambling
The other tax on online gambling
Carlos Lalanda ·
THE OTHER TAX ON ONLINE GAMBLING
Quite a number of years ago, the levy on games of chance, created back in 1977 and colloquially known as the “Gambling Fiscal Fee”, was technically regarded as a “fee”, until the Constitutional Court itself put matters right by characterising it as a “tax”, although it is still referred to as a fee in the official gazettes. Inexplicably.
The new Gambling Law of 2011 introduced the so-called “Tax on Gambling Activities”, which ultimately was the same “fee”, but with its own characteristics, somewhat different from those of the parent levy.
However, it also added certain fees for administrative procedures arising from the application of this new Law, in consideration for the services to be provided by the new National Gambling Commission (CNJ) (which never came into being and was replaced by the current Directorate-General for the Regulation of Gambling (DGOJ)), including a new “strange fee” which does not correspond to specific actions or services involved in processing applications, but is instead charged in consideration for the “regulatory activities of the CNJ”.
This is the form of the fee described in Article 49.2, paragraph f), of Law 13/2013 on the regulation of gambling at State level. This “fee” is applicable to each online gambling operator, normally accrues on 31 December each year, and is paid each year in January of the following year; the amount payable is determined by applying a rate proportional to gross operating revenue (1/1,000 in the original wording, 0.75/1,000 in the current wording).
As we are in the payment period, this is a good time to reflect on its amount, its validity and whether this play on words may actually have any consequences and, perhaps, whether challenging it might even be legitimate.
Clue 1: The true nature of this “Fee” under paragraph f), and its quantification.
In the Spanish tax system there is an essential difference between a “Tax” and a “Fee”. The administrative activities described in paragraphs a) to g) of that article clearly constitute “fees”: if an operator applies for a licence, registration in the Register, a registry certificate or approval of a technical system, or even when it undergoes an inspection or technical verification, it is generating administrative activity the cost of which it should bear, and the Law determines the amount of this consideration in advance.
However, this is not the case with our paragraph f), since, by their nature, “regulatory activities” neither affect nor benefit a specific operator, but form part of the Administration’s own activity and its functions and powers established by law and regulations. They affect us all. Furthermore, the fee accrues on 31 December each year (for the whole year), and the taxable base is “gross operating revenue”, meaning that some pay more and others less, depending on their business activity. We are therefore clearly dealing with a genuine “tax”, and the constitutional doctrine applicable to the “Gambling Fiscal Fee” would support this.
There are already clear precedents in our tax system, such as the so-called “Telecommunications Fee”, which was precisely the model for this gambling fee, was widely challenged by operators and ultimately culminated in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 21 July 2011, resulting in the rectification of numerous self-assessments and refunds of the amounts paid. That judgment, and the subsequent judgments of the Spanish Supreme Court (TS) which follow it, state that, at the very least, its amount should be calculated on the basis of the “administrative costs associated with general authorisation procedures”
The administrative gambling fee could not, a priori, be imposed in respect of a cost that cannot be individualised or particularised in any way. We are therefore faced with a “Fee” which, in my view, is a genuine tax and which may be contrary to the Spanish and European tax systems. It would be sufficient to challenge its application, potentially obtaining a judgment recognising and applying this classification.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the case law referred to above gives grounds for considering that the telecommunications fee, within its scope of application, could be justified by reference to “the costs actually incurred by the competent national authority in relation to a specific operator over a given period”, and that, consequently, taking as the taxable base “…the operating revenue base could be an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criterion”. In other words, a kind of “fee for maintaining the authorisation and the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC) or the CNJ” and for the costs this entails.
However, even in this scenario, the aggregate “fees” could not, a priori, exceed the costs incurred by the Administration responsible for overseeing the authorisation. The solution, according to that case law, is that the administrative body must substantiate those costs and the formulae for their specific allocation.
This gives us grounds to investigate the costs incurred by the DGOJ in carrying out this supervisory activity, in other words, to dissect its annual budget and analyse several of these economic parameters, so as also to rule out this justification in relation to the administrative gambling fee.
Clue 2. Revenue from this Fee and the DGOJ’s operating expenditure
We do not know exactly how much revenue has been generated by this fee under paragraph f) in the years since its introduction, because the figures are published together with those for the other fees under paragraphs a) to g). Except in financial years in which new licence applications or renewals have been processed, most of the revenue comes from the fees under paragraph f).
The following figures could be extracted from the State Budgets and their outturn:
| Revenue collected (€ million) | |
| Year 2019 | 20.018 |
| Year 2020 | 21.84 |
| Year 2021 | 23.15 |
| Year 2022 | 31.67 (budgeted in Law 31/2022). |
A substantial but declining proportion of this comes from SELAE, in respect of its revenue from pool betting on sports (€5.76 million in 2020 and €7.019 million in 2021, for example, according to that entity’s accounts).
For their part, in successive Budget Laws and State Accounts, the allocations for the operation of the DGOJ within the Ministry of Consumer Affairs (with all the regulatory powers to which the taxable event refers) are included under programme item 496M. They were as follows
| Expenditure (€ million) | ||
| Year 2019 | 6.871 (outturn) | |
| Year 2020 | 6.267 (outturn) | |
| Year 2021 | 5.168 (outturn) | |
| Year 2022 | 12.36 (Budgeted in Law 31/2022). | This item corresponds approximately to €5.70 million for ordinary items + €6.60 million for “new items |
As in the years preceding those cited, it can be verified with patience that, in every financial year since its creation in 2011, the “fee revenue” item far exceeds the budget item for the body performing the administrative function, an almost unique and isolated feature in our legal system. This is so much the case that, when the Gambling Law was amended by Law 16/2012, of 27 December, the rate must already have appeared very high, and it was decided to reduce it from 1/1,000 to 0.75/1,000.
In light of the above figures, we must reiterate the earlier conclusion: the administrative fees for gambling management are not intended to “pay for the budget item generated by the DGOJ in its operation”; still less to exceed it.
Among other obvious reasons, this is because the same Law approves another levy, this time also a genuine tax: the Tax on Gambling Activities, which generated approximately €161 million in 2019, €157 million in 2020 and €141 million in 2021. Those sums alone may readily be regarded as sufficient to “pay for” budget item 452M, allocated to the operation of the DGOJ.
The amount of that Gambling Tax could even pay for the operation of the entire Ministry of Consumer Affairs, which in 2023 amounts to €63.69 million (having increased compared with the previous year precisely because of a budget item that we shall examine below).
But what is the Administrative Fee for gambling management actually used for?
Clue 3. The other side of the coin: The destination of the Administrative Fee for gambling management.
Normally, any fees, even though they serve to “compensate for the particular public service”, are included in and allocated to the general revenue budget, without being earmarked for any expenditure. This is a general budgetary principle from which exceptions may be made only where a Law so provides and permits. One such exception, incidentally included in the Gambling Law itself and of “historical” origin, is the distribution of the Gambling Tax collected on SELAE’s pool betting[1], which, under that same Law, is used to subsidise the Football League (45.50%), the Spanish Football Federation (4.55%) or the Provincial Councils (49.95%), in percentages specified by law.
Initially, the full amount of the Administrative Gambling Fee went each year into the General State Budget, until Law 11/2020 introduced a provision partially earmarking the revenue from this Fee, by adding the following to the provisions governing the rate:
“f) 0.75 per thousand of gross operating revenue, of which 25% shall be earmarked to strengthen the material resources, instruments and investments necessary to undertake initiatives to combat fraud, as well as prevention, communication, awareness-raising, intervention and remediation measures that facilitate responsible gambling practices and mitigate the undesirable effects caused by unhealthy gambling activity, and to carry out studies, reports and research in this field”
This year, 2023, this provision is given effect in programme 496M of the Budget, managed by the DGOJ, so that, as we have seen, in addition to the allocation for the DGOJ’s “ordinary” operation (approximately €5.5 million), a further €6.6 million is added for other purposes, authorised in several Additional Provisions of the Budget Law (LP), including:
- grants for the development of research activities relating to the prevention of gambling disorders and their effects. €1.3 million
- grant to public hospitals providing treatment related to gambling addiction. €100,000
- grants to families and non-profit institutions relating to research into mechanisms for detecting at-risk behaviour (that is, rehabilitation associations specified by name: €125,000) and a further €700,000 without specifically named recipients.
- Expenditure on investments of an “intangible nature”: €2,100,000.
In short, up to the full 25% of the aforementioned “fee” collected in this year, 2023, which, without any other reason to substantiate an increase in the fee, increases compared with the previous year. The overall revenue scenario is the same, although the budgeted figure is €31.7 million.
In other words, approximately €7.92 million is allocated to this 25% earmarking.
The remaining 75% (approximately €25.1 million) will, as always, go into the General State Budget without being earmarked for any specific expenditure and, in any event, will represent revenue far exceeding the operating cost of the Directorate-General for the Regulation of Gambling itself.
Conclusions
The first is theoretical: everything described above represents a reversal of tax and budgetary logic, since, constitutionally, taxes are intended to meet public expenditure; not the other way round, which is what happens with this fee: creating new expenditure because of excess revenue.
The second is much more practical from the perspective of the taxpayers (gambling operators: they would do better to seek its abolition. (and claim a refund).
[1] In 2019: €53.047 million; in 2020: €39.47 million; in 2021: €44.24 million, and in 2021: €45 million budgeted
Madrid, 13 January 2023.
Carlos Lalanda Fernández.
carlos.lalanda@loyra.com