Gaming & Gambling
The Supreme Court judgment on I.A.E. applied to gaming halls.
Carlos Lalanda ·
This time we examine the Judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Chamber, Section 2) of 6 March 2018, ruling on the interpretation of the tax rules governing the Gambling Activities Tax (IAE), applied to gaming halls, and in particular to the gaming machines operated within them.
What it states may also be extrapolated to the taxation of type “A” machines, or even type “C” machines in casinos.
It may be summarised in the following striking conclusion: the operation of these machines on such premises gives rise not to one IAE charge, nor to two, but to three at the same time.
A brief historical note on the IAE under discussion
The matter examined in this judgment is not new, nor should it take us by surprise, since the “old hands” already knew that amusement and gaming machines were subject to the Fiscal Licence Tax, having been included in the Tariffs approved by Royal Decree 791/1981, at a time when gaming halls were normally operated by a proprietor who owned or leased the premises, and type “B” gaming machines or type “A” machines were supplied by third-party operating companies holding the “administrative permits”, with which a division of the takings was agreed. The same applied in casinos to type “C” machines.
The Fiscal Licence Tax for the establishment was paid by its proprietor, and that for the machines by their owner under the original wording, and subsequently by the operating company.
This original business model fell into disuse shortly afterwards and, in practically every case, the proprietor of the premises also became the holder of the authorisations and the owner of the machines themselves.
When the Fiscal Licence Tax was replaced by IAE under Royal Legislative Decree 1175/1990, this brought with it, in this respect, a curious reproduction of the mystery of the Trinity: the operation of these machines in gaming halls was included under 3 different headings: 969.4 (relating to the premises themselves, with variable elements arising from their location, floor area, etc.); 969.6 (each amusement machine, through a “national” unit charge); and again 969.6 (each machine, through a “minimum municipal charge”), also varying according to location. The same may be reproduced in the case of bingo halls or casinos where gaming machines are operated.
Subsequently, and for many years, there have been various interpretations of this “biblical mystery”, some of which, accepted by various regional courts and tribunals, embraced another of the tax principles permitted under this Tax: where several headings apply to the same activity, the taxable person may choose any of them (Rule 13), and would obviously usually choose the lowest charge.
Vigo City Council and the Supreme Court
Vigo City Council disagreed with the choice of Heading made by the proprietor of the gaming hall and the machines installed within it, and, after a tax inspection report had been drawn up, the matter reached the High Court of Justice of Galicia, which upheld the municipality’s triple assessment, even contrary to the previous judicial approach. The taxpayer concerned therefore had no option but to bring the appeal in cassation whose outcome we now know and discuss with astonishment.
In my humble opinion, I do not agree with a single one of the statements or arguments it contains.
The Supreme Court states, more or less, that the interpretation of this triplicity or separation is appropriate even in the present circumstances; that three distinct economic activities can be identified, which it even ventures to define and “demarcate”; and that the proprietors of these gaming halls (and, we would add, bingo halls or casinos) cannot avail themselves of the option under Rule 13 (an unlucky number, it would seem), as can “ordinary mortals”, business operators of every kind who pay IAE.
By way of illustration, its assessment of the work of a gaming hall operator such as the appellant is as follows: one activity carried on consists of “holding title to the premises (or, if preferred, making the space available for the operation of the machine” and another, distinct activity is that of “holding title to the machine”, rather as if the first consisted of “renting the premises to oneself” so that the “other self” could operate them. The strange case of Dr.Jekyll and Mr.Hide.
The “innovations” and “omissions” of the Judgment
From this rich reading of the judgment we therefore extract a “new tax theory”, developed judicially and hitherto unknown: the theory of the two faces of a single activity, which is equivalent to a double (or triple) economic capacity on the part of taxpayers. Added to this is a “splitting of the taxable person”, one for each of the aforementioned headings.
A true judicial “tax discovery”, said with unavoidable and bitter irony, to which another is added, implicit in the decision, although probably not sufficiently emphasised in the appeal: that the “activity” of operating a Gaming Hall is not only taxed 3 times under IAE, as the Chamber demonstrates and permits, but once again, beforehand and specifically, under the Gambling Levy, an identical direct tax which, as the Constitutional Court (TC) and the Supreme Court itself explain in their judgments, also falls on the activity of the business operator who operates the gaming machines. We are therefore faced with the application of multiple tax charges to the same taxable event.
An interpretation of the IAE Tariffs applicable to this activity that was more consistent with present-day reality, which is entirely different from that of more than 30 years ago (that is, interpreting them as Article 3.1 of the Civil Code advises, and as was requested), would have recognised the impossibility of taxing several times, in respect of the same business activity, the sole actual business operator now engaged in operating gaming halls or casinos, namely their proprietor. Alternatively, given the manifest duplication of taxation, it would have been advisable to refer a question of constitutionality on the basis of the potentially confiscatory nature of IAE under the headings discussed (any of the 3), since it taxes exactly the same taxable event as the Gambling Tax Levy.
As the foregoing does not seem likely even within the narrow avenue of the constitutional rights appeal remaining open to the appellant, the only hope is that, to cause these business operators less confusion, the Ministry of Finance will decide (in agreement with the Autonomous Communities, of course), in a burst of good sense, to simplify matters by declaring an exemption from IAE in these cases, even if this were very likely to be accompanied by a corresponding amendment to the amount of the Levy.
Meanwhile, very poor omens are emerging regarding forthcoming decisions pending before the same Court, the same Chamber and Section, in appeals in cassation concerning tax matters very closely related to these activities.
Madrid, 14 April 2018
Carlos Lalanda Fernández
Loya Abogados.