Gaming & Gambling
Supreme Court judgment of 12 July 2018: validity of penalty clauses in contracts for the installation of gaming machines in hospitality premises.
Carlos Lalanda ·
Allow us to
highlight the importance, for an entire sector, of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court (Civil Chamber, Section 1) on 12 July 2018.which determines on appeal in cassation the validity of a penalty clause agreed in a contract for the operation of gaming machines in hospitality premises in the province of Cádiz, entered into between the proprietor and the operating company.
We emphasise that the dispute arose in Cádiz because it was the Provincial Civil Court of that province which held, in the case under consideration, and upheld on appeal the approach adopted by the lower court, that the amount payable under penalty clauses of this kind may be reduced where the circumstances indicate that it is disproportionate or excessive in relation to the loss actually suffered by the operating company when the proprietor of the hospitality premises is in breach.
The lower court and the Provincial Court of Cádiz reduced the operator's initial claim for compensation from the proprietor of the premises from €93.209,18 to €2.016,08, and also relieved the defendant of the obligation to pay the costs of the proceedings.
This reduction was made on the basis of Article 1.154 of the Civil Code (CC), which reads as follows:
“Obligations with a penalty clause”.
Article 1154
The judge shall equitably adjust the penalty where the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly performed by the debtor.
The importance of the judgment on appeal in cassation lies in the fact that, although this issue had previously been addressed by the Supreme Court in terms favourable to operators (in judgments such as those of 10 June 2014 or 17 March 2014), the approach taken by the Provincial Court of Cádiz could have shaken this doctrine and, with it, the entire understanding of the implicit value of agreements entered into between operators and proprietors of these premises throughout Spain.
The reasons for including these penalty clauses in these contracts.
From the earliest instances of gaming machines being operated in hospitality establishments, the execution of written contracts between the two parties normally involved proved decisive: the company operating the machines and the proprietors of the premises where they are installed, the number of which has broadly fluctuated between 200.000 and 300.000 establishments.
These contractual relationships, which have no clear legal classification (service contracts according to some, partnership contracts according to others; in any event, atypical contracts), are governed primarily by the intention of the parties as embodied in these contracts; and from the outset it was necessary to include these penalty clauses, which went beyond generic provisions for compensation for loss and damage. In the event of a breach by the proprietor of the premises, the amount of the “penalty” consists, in most cases, of a fixed or ascertainable sum based on a daily figure, and normally covers a fixed period (for example, six months, or until the date of termination of the contract).
This latter period and clause have become widespread where, under the various Gaming Machine Regulations, the authorisation to install machines in premises itself has a specified term (e.g. five years) and, moreover, for various administrative reasons which we shall not address here, is usually granted exclusively to the operating company concerned, so that this authorisation has become a right carrying an expectation of certain or ascertainable value.
Consequently, these administrative authorisations, together with the execution of these contracts with these premises, form the basis of a value for these companies which can be recognised as an asset.
The facts admitted in the judgment under appeal acknowledged a daily loss of 41, 92 euros per day for one of the machines and 42, 79 euros for the other, but after multiplying this figure by the time remaining until the end of the contract, the lower court deducted the days on which those machines had been moved to and operated in other premises of the same operating company. From 93.209, 209, 18 euros to 2.216, 08, as we said.
The breach by the proprietor of the premises, involving the removal of the installed machines, may lead to their installation elsewhere, but in replacement of other machines whose returns would, in broad terms, have been obtained in any event. It is not the case that the loss caused by the breach is compensated for or reduced by this substitution. What actually happens in such a case is that the operating company ceases to receive the profits it expected in relation to those premises for the contractual period agreed upon and breached, while continuing to receive those it had also anticipated from the other premises under a separate contract.
Fortunately for operators, this is what the Supreme Court has clearly grasped in its ruling.
These penalty clauses therefore provide not only for the losses arising from the operation of the particular machines (which, when installed in other premises, may generate similar takings and consequently minimise those losses), but also for the aforementioned loss of profit.
If compensation under clauses of this kind were judicially moderated (“reduced”), even on the basis of Article 1154 of the CC (on the assessment that “the losses are minimal”), this would in reality undermine the entire structure constituting the asset value of the companies operating these machines.
We would be facing a genuine judicial earthquake, which the lower court and the Provincial Court of Cádiz were beginning to unleash.
The judgment examines the courts' power to reduce penalties and corrects the Provincial Court.
The Supreme Court corrects the Provincial Court and the lower court, since the judgments under appeal did not declare the clause unfair; rather, the judicial bodies were exercising their “judicial powers to reduce penalties”.
However, the Supreme Court recalls the doctrine concerning the powers to reduce penalties, developed in judgments such as the Supreme Court judgment of 13 September 2016, which make clear that this power may only operate where the resulting penalty becomes extraordinarily greater than the amount of loss and damage actually caused; and, moreover, only where there has been a change of circumstances which was unforeseeable at the time of contracting and is inconsistent with the parties' perspective at the outset.
The Supreme Court's judgment considers that what the parties agreed by way of a penalty clause specifically provided for the consequences of breach and the substantial loss of profit affecting the operating company's finances when it ceases to obtain returns from particular premises, which is what happens in practice under the current structure of the commercial operation of these machines, both now and when the contract was entered into.
The position of the Provincial Court of Cádiz, which in turn follows that of the Court of First Instance, was, in the Supreme Court's expressive reasoning, “voluntarist and guided by a sense of pity, but is not in accordance with the law”.
The importance of this doctrine for the gaming machine operators' sector
The Supreme Court's doctrine on this matter was clear and decisive before the judgment discussed here, recognising the validity of these contractual penalty clauses.
What was at stake in the new judgment, therefore, was whether this doctrine would be maintained or revised, the latter of which would have amounted to a genuine earthquake in the asset value of gaming machine operating companies in Spain.
In this case, the earthquake did not occur.
Madrid, 19 August 2018.
Carlos Lalanda Fernández