Regulatory & Compliance

The Supreme Court judgment of 31 October 2023 on public authorities’ liability in damages arising from the states of alarm of 2020.

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Once the abnormal situation in which we remained throughout 2020 and part of 2021, with compulsory restrictions on many of our most basic personal and business freedoms, had passed, there was a clamour to challenge the various measures restricting rights of all kinds adopted in the Royal Decrees establishing the states of alarm in the fight against the COVID 19 pandemic. This discontent led to the lodging of thousands of appeals and claims before the courts seeking redress for the evident sacrifices we were obliged to bear.

Royal Decree 463/2020 of 14 March and the subsequent Royal Decrees, immediately ratified and successively renewed by the Congress of Deputies, were the subject of numerous legal proceedings, and, as regards the penalties imposed on individuals arising from restrictions on movement, Constitutional Court (TC) Judgment 148/2021 and subsequently Judgment 183/2021 declared various articles null and void, which in turn rendered virtually all the fines imposed on this ground null and void. However, the remainder of these Royal Decrees remained intact from a constitutional standpoint.  In the case of the suspension of business activities, numerous groups and economic sectors considered that their claims should be pursued through the legal institution of liability in damages (of the State or the Legislature), in accordance with the concepts established by the Constitution, the law and our case law.
More than 2 years after the first challenges brought by this route, a first judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court on 31 October (reporting judge Carlos Lesmes), which sought to resolve at one stroke the numerous and varied arguments and approaches employed. A recent academic commentary accordingly describes it, most aptly, as the “Supreme judgment”.

 

The responses to the various grounds of challenge: a well-structured response.

 

In my view, the Supreme Court (TS) has endeavoured to address exhaustively all the arguments on which the matter had been raised, providing a detailed response, and little more can be said, this being an appeal brought by the owner of a hospitality and catering establishment (Alhambra Palace SA).

Starting with a detailed description of the numerous provisions adopted successively over time (Royal Decrees declaring states of alarm, extensions, Ministerial Orders on “de-escalation”, etc.), the Court examines all manner of grounds of challenge concerning liability in damages in its various forms, addressed in the order of the legal grounds:

Legal Ground V: The treatment and classification of the issues in dispute in the light of the reference to a possible entitlement to compensation contained in Article 3.2 of Organic Law 4/1981, governing states of alarm, emergency and siege.

Legal Ground VI: The liability in damages of the “Legislature”. In accordance with legal scholarship, case law and, finally, positive law, recognition of this type of liability must be based on a prior declaration of unconstitutionality by the TC. Reference is thus made to the earlier Judgments 148/2021 and 183/2021, which specifically held that the provisions ordering the suspension of activities were constitutionally valid, unlike those restricting personal freedoms through lockdown.

Legal Ground VII. Nor can liability be attributed where the requirement of “unlawfulness” is absent, since those states of alarm and suspensions of activities constitute general burdens rather than special sacrifices. This is so even though the suspension affected not all but many sectors of the economy.

Legal Ground VIII. Article 3.2 of Organic Law 4/1981, governing states of alarm, emergency and siege. The Court concludes that this provision does not contain a new and distinct system of strict liability in damages. This was, in my view, the principal ground of these challenges, hitherto unresolved owing to the limited or non-existent judicial treatment of this issue, since this Law had in fact been applied on only one previous occasion.

Legal Ground IX. It rules out addressing these challenges from the standpoint of expropriation law, although it bases this primarily on the fact that the Royal Decrees make no mention of the matter. An alternative response, which I myself advocated at the time, was to argue that this omission was no obstacle, just as, in any compulsory expropriation, an expropriated party is not left without safeguards merely because they have not been included in the proceedings. The TS does not accept this route either.

Legal Ground X examines another of the requirements for liability in damages, namely the absence of force majeure, and takes the view that the Covid 19 pandemic precisely has this legal character, the existence of which would have precluded a finding of liability even if the other legal requirements examined had been met.

Legal Ground XI. Lastly, the judgment examines briefly, but sufficiently, certain other approaches to the challenge, such as possible maladministration in the implementation of the measures by the Administration.

Finally, it orders the appellant to pay costs in the amount of 4,000 euros.

Its impact on claims brought by companies in the gambling sector.

 

The conclusions and responses in the judgment can undoubtedly and without exception be applied to the suspension of activities at gambling establishments, such as casinos, bingo halls, gaming machine halls and betting premises, and even to the temporary closure of hospitality establishments where gaming machines were installed.

The various activities connected with games of chance were ordered to close during two clearly defined periods:
 -During the First state of alarm, pursuant to the orders of the Central Government.
 -During the Second state of alarm, under a system of “co-governance” of the measures, in accordance with the                     orders of each Autonomous Community; a much more complex situation to analyse, as measures were even                     adopted on a municipality-by-municipality or neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood basis.

In most cases, the measures relating to gambling establishments appeared in the same provisions as those imposed on many other very similar activities, such as the hospitality establishments in the judgment.

In short, and in my view, the judgments delivered as a result of claims brought by companies operating games of chance will follow the same course and result in dismissal. It is therefore advisable to review their procedural position and, perhaps, consider withdrawing those at a similar stage, since an order for costs very similar to the one indicated is foreseeable.

The particular case of the Gambling Tax as a “compensable expense”.

 

There is one very specific situation which, in certain cases, might nevertheless still be connected with these claims: a claim for the expense consisting of the Gambling Tax charge applied to gaming machines, insofar as, in all cases existing to date, this is a fixed annual or quarterly amount, and precisely for all or most of the period during which the premises where they were installed were ordered to close temporarily (the same cannot be said of the Tax which is proportional in the case of certain games, such as those in casinos, bingo or betting).

The reason is that, since the Tax is a devolved State tax, the Autonomous Communities (CCAA) may lawfully approve reductions and reliefs in respect of the fixed charge, and this was the approach taken in most territories, on the basis of evident constitutional principles of tax fairness: no tax contribution can be made when the “wealth” subject to taxation does not exist, as is the case with closure orders: the machines simply could not be installed, and the authorisation granted could not be exercised owing to the application of the legal provision.

However, in certain very specific CCAA (Castilla y León, Asturias and La Rioja), neither were statutory tax relief measures adopted, nor have their respective Courts of Justice subsequently adopted any other compensatory solution, clinging to the supposedly strict literal wording defining the legal nature of the “taxable event”, which is, after all, an element of taxation that cannot be devolved to the CCAA and on which they have not ruled definitively, since these Courts are not the “apex” of State law, but of Autonomous Community law.

It is striking to observe that some of the preceding regional judgments refer to the possibility of including a claim precisely through the route of public authorities’ liability in damages, which amounts to a kind of “escape clause” and even reveals a certain “guilty conscience” in dismissing something so evident from the perspective of the adjudicating Court’s tax-law analysis. This route would now be substantially undermined by the judgment on which I comment here, since, if it had been an “item capable of inclusion” in compensation for liability, it can scarcely now be allowed in view of the TS’s conclusion. Nor should it be forgotten that the “escape” argument opened up in certain judgments relies on the well-known case law requiring reimbursement of the expense of the supplementary Gambling Tax levy of 1990……. precisely because the TC declared that levy unconstitutional, something which, as we have now seen, has not occurred here.

Fortunately, the TS has admitted several appeals in cassation against the aforementioned regional judgments, very probably because, as I said, the “taxable event” remains within the competence of the State and, ultimately, its final interpretation falls to the TS, since otherwise access to cassation would have been precluded.

In short, there are still well-founded hopes of obtaining these proportionate reductions in the tax charge for the period of closure as a result of the judgments in cassation, without any need to refer a question of unconstitutionality to the TC, since, in my view, even though no express reliefs or reductions have been approved by the aforementioned CCAA, this is the approach most consistent with the constitutional rule.(see link to the Article published on this subject in Azarplus magazine, September 2023)

Carlos Lalanda Fernandez.
Loyra Abogados.
Madrid, 23 November 2023.

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