Gaming & Gambling

Judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Chamber, Second Section), of 6 March 2018

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The Judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Chamber, Second Section), of 6 March 2018. rules on the interpretation of the tax provisions governing the Tax on Gambling Activities (IAE), as applied to gaming halls, and in particular to the gaming machines operated therein.

Its findings may also be extrapolated to the taxation of type “A” machines, or even type “C” machines in casinos.

It may be summarised in the following striking conclusion: the operation of these machines on such premises gives rise not to one IAE charge, nor to two, but to three at the same time.

A brief historical note on the IAE at issue. The matter examined in this judgment is not new, nor can it take us by surprise, since the “old hands” already knew that amusement and gaming machines were subject to the Fiscal Licence tax, having been included in the Tariffs approved by Royal Decree 791/1981, at a time when gaming halls were normally run by a business proprietor who owned or leased the premises, and type “B” gaming machines or type “A” machines were supplied by third-party operating companies, which held the “administrative permits” and with which a division of the takings was agreed. The same applied in casinos to type “C” machines.

The Fiscal Licence tax for the establishment was paid by its proprietor, and that for the machines by their owner under the original wording, and subsequently by the operating company.

This original business model soon fell into disuse, and in practically all cases the proprietor of the premises also became the holder of the authorisations and the owner of the machines themselves.

When the Fiscal Licence tax was replaced by the IAE under Royal Legislative Decree 1175/1990, this brought with it, in this respect, a curious reproduction of the mystery of the Trinity: the operation of these machines in gaming halls was included under 3 different tariff headings: 969.4 (covering the premises themselves, with variable elements deriving from their location, floor area, etc.); 969.6 (each amusement machine, through a “national” charge per unit); and again 969.6 (each machine, through a “minimum municipal charge”), which also varied according to location. The same may be reproduced in the case of bingo halls or casinos in which gaming machines are operated.

Subsequently, and for many years, there have been various interpretations of this “biblical mystery”, one of which, accepted by several regional courts and tribunals, embraces another of the tax principles permitted under this Tax: where several tariff headings apply to the same activity, the taxable person may choose any of them (Rule 13), and would obviously usually choose the lowest charge.

Vigo City Council and the Supreme Court.  Dissatisfied with the tariff heading chosen by the proprietor of the gaming hall and the machines installed therein, Vigo City Council drew up a tax inspection report, after which the matter reached the High Court of Justice of Galicia, which upheld the municipality’s threefold assessment, even contrary to the earlier judicial approach. The taxpayer concerned therefore had no choice but to bring the appeal on points of law whose outcome we now know and discuss, with astonishment.

In my humble opinion, I do not agree with a single one of the assertions or arguments it contains.

The Supreme Court states, more or less, that the interpretation of this triplicity or separation is appropriate even in the current circumstances; that three distinct economic activities can be identified, which it even ventures to define and “demarcate”; and that the proprietors of these gaming halls (and, we would add, bingo halls or casinos) cannot avail themselves of the option under Rule 13 (an unlucky number, it would seem), as can the “ordinary mortals” engaged in businesses of every kind who pay IAE.

By way of illustration, its observation on the work of a gaming hall proprietor such as the appellant is as follows: the activity carried on consists in “the proprietorship of the premises (or, if one prefers, making the space available for the operation of the machine” and another, distinct activity is “the ownership of the machine”, rather as if the first consisted in “letting the premises to oneself” so that the “other self” could operate them. The strange case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hide.

The “novelties” and “omissions” of the Judgment. From this rich reading of the judgment, we therefore derive a “new tax theory” developed by the courts and hitherto unknown: the theory of the two sides of a single activity, which is equivalent to that of a double (or triple) economic capacity on the part of taxpayers. To this is added a “splitting of the taxable person”, one for each of the tariff headings mentioned.

A true judicial “tax discovery”, said with necessary and bitter irony, to which is added another implicit in the decision, although probably not sufficiently emphasised in the appeal: that the “activity” of operating a Gaming Hall is taxed not only 3 times under the IAE, as the Chamber demonstrates and permits, but once more, previously and specifically, under the Gambling Levy, an identical tax of a direct nature which, as the Constitutional Court (TC) and the Supreme Court itself explain in their judgments, also falls upon the activity of the business proprietor operating the gaming machines.

We are therefore faced with the imposition of multiple tax charges on a single taxable event.

An interpretation of the IAE Tariffs applicable to this activity that was more consistent with present-day reality, which is entirely different from that of more than 30 years ago (that is, interpreting them as Article 3.1 of the Civil Code advises and as was requested), would have recognised the impossibility of taxing several times, in respect of the same business activity, the sole actual business operator who exists today in the operation of gaming halls or casinos, namely their proprietor. Or indeed, given the manifest duplication of taxation, it would have been advisable to refer a question of constitutionality on the basis of the potentially confiscatory nature of the IAE under the tariff headings discussed (any of the 3), since it taxes precisely the same taxable event as the Fiscal Levy on Gambling.

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