Gaming & Gambling

The Supreme Court judgment of 23 July 2018: Websites offering SELAE lotteries and betting

Carlos Lalanda ·

In matters of gambling, the Supreme Court has been giving “a mixture of good and bad” in its judgments. And in this judgment of 23 July (see link)  we are rather faced with a bucket of sand thrown over the websites where we can place bets on lotteries.

It should be clarified that this judgment does not concern the websites of SELAE and ONCE themselves, which rank very highly in terms of visits, but rather many others managed by entities specialising in the Internet which actually help to increase SELAE’s revenue.

An examination of the judgment suggests that, in all likelihood, the information available to the Court was limited or inadequate regarding the actual circumstances, which are so complex in the operation of businesses conducted over the Internet; or that the bulk of the arguments on certain specific points obscured the proper approach: it is sometimes said that “the trees prevent us from seeing the wood as a whole”.

It is also possible that the appellant was unable to set out its reasoning adequately. An Instruction issued by the Supreme Court itself requires all submissions and arguments to be presented within a maximum of 25 folio-sized pages, with 1.5 line spacing, in 12-point Times New Roman, and with margins of 2.5 cm. Any excess of words may result in the document submitted being declared inadmissible.

What was at issue in the case

Be that as it may, the Court decided to interpret certain rules relating to gambling and determine whether the Internet services provided by the appellant constitute an administrative offence under Gambling Law 13/2011.

What did the appellant’s activity consist of?

What administrative offence was it accused of?

In my opinion, the Supreme Court has not understood what this entity actually did and does on its website or, rather, has “gone off at a tangent” in its assessment; furthermore, and most seriously, it has failed to unravel the meaning of the statutory definition of the offence under the Gambling Law applied to the sanctioned party, consisting of the absence of SELAE’s “authorisation” in cases where “gambling material” is “marketed”.

The Court has sought to interpret the meaning of the expressions “to market” and “gambling material”, but has forgotten to examine the principal issue: what the “authorisation” referred to in the statutory definition of the offence actually is.

Before proceeding, another preliminary point concerning the law governing sanctions must be clarified: a sanction or penalty may only be imposed where the conduct in question is expressly provided for in the text of the Law. Otherwise, a constitutional provision is infringed and the sanction is void.

The correct application of any law imposing sanctions is more likely where the facts are, from experience, “easily identifiable” and the definition of the offence is a clearly defined “hypothesis”. In the Court’s defence, neither is the case here, and both require thorough dissection, but an attempt must be made, if only for the sake of conceptual refinement and clarity.

Facts: What the appellant did.

The appellant had a very popular website in which many customers placed their trust in order ultimately to acquire, through its intermediation, the “products” offered by SELAE (lottery tickets or betting slips for football pools).

The discussion in the proceedings revolves (and revolves excessively) around whether the appellant “sold” or “marketed” these “products”, or what on earth it actually did.

Knowing how these websites operate, it is clear that the appellant merely acts as an intermediary between the customers of its website and one or more Lottery Agencies, the true “sales agents” for SELAE’s “products”. With one sole exception (its own gambling website), SELAE does not “sell” its “products” through its own establishments, but through its external Agents, which make up its “sales networks”. And this is also what happens in the case under discussion, since until the amount of the bet reaches the Agent, the latter does not issue any ticket or betting slip, nor can any “sale” be considered to have taken place.

The activity of these websites, acting as intermediaries between players and SELAE’s Agents, is confined to the same activity as that carried out by any of the latter’s external associates, of whom there are many in practice, particularly in the months preceding the El Gordo Christmas lottery draw: businesses, associations, political parties, bars, restaurants and the “sellers” we encounter in the streets act as “external associates” of the Points of Sale. A high percentage of readers of this article will know someone in their family who acquires a one-tenth share of a lottery ticket which they distribute or share among its members. In some cases with an additional surcharge, in others without, the particular feature of the case under consideration being the use of the Internet. Sophisticated and imaginative Internet applications and tools allow players to participate in draws from home without moving more than a finger………… What has happened for this to be considered an offence in some cases and, in most cases, not?

In lotteries and other games of chance, nothing is “bought”; rather, a “bet” is placed

 In the preceding paragraphs, I have placed the act of “selling” SELAE lottery tickets or betting slips in quotation marks because the contract is not one of “sale”, but one of “gaming and betting”. The same applies to “products” such as tickets and betting slips. When an amount is handed over to Selae’s Agents (or directly to SELAE on its gambling website), no “product” is “bought”; rather, a “bet” is placed on a draw or an event, an activity which SELAE operates on a monopoly basis, together with ONCE.

And the betting slip is not a “product” or an object capable of valuation, but proof of the bet. Nothing more, nothing less.

And the betting contract is only completed when its amount enters the technical system (terminal) of SELAE’s Agent. Not when the bet is submitted or formalised on the intermediaries’ website.

These differences might appear inconsequential, but they are essential to understanding the entire applicable legal framework and arriving at a logical interpretation of what the Law intends and of the unlawful conduct that may be sanctioned.

Yet this true nature of the contract is disregarded or sidestepped by the Supreme Court, which implies that the entire process of “buying or selling” betting slips or tickets carried out by the appellant does not pass through SELAE’s Agents, whom it ignores.  These Agents are known as “Point of Sale Managers” and may be “Dedicated” (formerly Lottery Agents) or “Mixed”, forming part of the Supplementary Network (or premises which also provide other services, such as hospitality); all of them are business operators independent of SELAE, with whom it has entered into commercial commission agency agreements, and it is within the framework of these agreements that they carry out their activity of attracting players and taking bets on SELAE’s behalf.

Internet intermediaries such as the appellant are external associates of the business operators in the Sales Network, and this is stated on their websites, where the mechanism used is explained, together with the various complex conditions governing the different procedures involving bettors on the website. And it is the latter who ultimately enter into the betting contracts with the Points of Sale. At the speed of light, and through digital operations, transactions and bets can be formalised in a matter of seconds or minutes. And it may appear that they are contracting with the websites, but in reality they enter into the gambling contract with the Points of Sale acting as SELAE’s Agents.

The contract and the bet placed by the customer become legally effective when the amount is paid to SELAE’s Agent and the latter issues the receipt. All other actions and services are ancillary to the principal one, and certainly make gambling easier and ultimately operate in favour of the operator, SELAE.

It is estimated that bets placed through this channel and received by SELAE may amount to some EUR 250 million per year [1]

In short, the appellant does not “operate” any lottery or betting activity subject to reservation or licensing under the Gambling Law, nor does this operation require any licence such as those needed by gambling operators as defined in the Law, nor does its activity compete with any licensed gambling operator or with SELAE, which ultimately receives the amounts staked. It is a genuine associate of the Sales Agents and, ultimately, of SELAE.

That being so … why, then, is it being pursued and sanctioned?

The other concurrent problem: the introduction by regulation of an “authorisation” from SELAE

The sanction is imposed because the appellant “had no authorisation” but……. what authorisation?

This “authorisation” from SELAE is not contained in the Gambling Law, but was included in the subsequent Royal Decree 1614/2011, a regulation implementing the Law. Its Article 30 provides, without this being provided for in the Law, that any associate of SELAE other than those belonging to the Sales Network must request “authorisation” to market its lotteries and betting (from SELAE, not from the Directorate for Gambling, as is the case for online gambling operators). Point of Sale Managers do not hold any authorisation, but have entered into a commercial agreement with SELAE.

Why, then, was this “authorisation” included in the regulation? On what terms?

It is very likely that the Government’s intention was good, and that this also constituted a positive measure from SELAE’s perspective (as a business operator), to achieve better control over the business it conducts; also from the perspective of consumers, who, under the seal of that “authorisation”, might enjoy greater assurance and confidence in the practical operation of betting.

However, for reasons of urgency, and coinciding also with SELAE’s incorporation as a public limited company, the text of Article 30 of the Royal Decree as adopted failed fully to define or clarify what this authorisation was; indeed, when questioned in the proceedings, SELAE stated that it had not granted any. And, by way of further reinforcement, the Regulation added the proviso that the absence of such authorisation was to be understood as falling within the statutory definition of the offence contained in Article 40(l) of the Law, which had not previously been the case.

In other words, Article 40(l) of the Law already existed with a clear and concise factual premise (“marketing any gambling material without authorisation (“administrative”); and the Regulation in fact extended its scope through the interpretation that, subsequently, SELAE’s authorisation was required for lotteries; and its absence was declared to fall within the definition of the offence.

An “authorisation from SELAE” is no longer an “administrative authorisation” today but, at most, a “contractual authorisation”. Any associate or Agent of SELAE no longer has to request any authorisation from it, but must instead enter into a contract with SELAE.

The lottery and betting operator is SELAE, and it has agreed “contractual authorisations” with its Agents; if the intention is that there should be no external associates of the Agents, distinct from the Agents themselves, this is a matter which now falls within the scope of the Point of Sale Management Agreements. A problem, and perhaps a dispute, with its own Agents under civil law and within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Not a problem of administrative sanctions law.

All of this is disregarded and ignored by the judgment, which repeatedly insists that the appellant had no authorisation … an administrative one!!; and that its procedures for attracting customers through the website are considered “gambling material”. A complete absurdity, in my humble opinion.

Is there a remedy?

 All that remains is to examine whether any form of appeal is available against a judgment which is final, having determined an appeal on points of law.

On the one hand, the Supreme Court (in its administrative jurisdiction) has based the existence of the offence on the absence or omission of a non-existent authorisation; and, having upheld an allegation improperly brought within the statutory definition of an offence, this can only be reviewed in proceedings on constitutional grounds: the extension of the definition of the offence is included and approved in a subordinate Regulation (Article 25.1 of the Spanish Constitution (CE)).

Furthermore, it has supplemented its thesis with another assessment which is difficult to understand: that the operation of a website constitutes “gambling material”, when in reality it is no more than software supporting specific procedures. (Article 24.1 CE)

Taking both factors together, and despite the difficulties involved in pursuing it, I believe that this is a case in which an appeal for constitutional protection may be brought.

Madrid, 24 September 2018

Carlos Lalanda Fernández

[1] Estimate based on data from the Memoria de SELAE 2016 and the Anuario del Juego en España, Fundación Codere 2016-2017

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