Gaming & Gambling

VAT IN THE HOSPITALITY SECTOR ARISING FROM GAMING MACHINES. Supreme Court judgment of 12 March 2019

Carlos Lalanda ·

On 12 March of this year, 2019,  the Supreme Court (Third Chamber, Second Section, number 314/2019) delivered the first of many judgments expected in the coming days and months concerning a common issue on appeal in cassation:  the applicability of VAT to relations between gaming machine operators and the proprietors of the (hospitality) establishments where the machines are installed.

It should logically be noted that these relations are contractual, not based on friendship or gratuitous, and are therefore established in return for monetary consideration, normally a percentage of the takings from the gaming machines.

The usual practice (except in the Valencian Community, as we shall see) was for hospitality proprietors to issue an invoice to the operating company for the agreed amount, to which 21% is added by way of VAT. The hospitality proprietor then naturally pays the VAT charged to the tax authorities, although there are cases involving individual hospitality proprietors in which the amount paid is calculated under the module-based assessment system.

Against this substantive reality, a separate matter is the designation of these relations: are they contracts for services, commission agency contracts or partnership agreements? This differs according to each person's perspective and differing opinion.

It is surprising that, almost 40 years after the first automatic machine was installed in premises of this kind, the classification of the peculiar underlying legal transaction is still being debated. As the Supreme Court rightly stated from the outset, it is an “atypical contract”, that is to say, one not described in the Spanish Civil Code. Of course, the Code dates from 1889, and automatic machines such as gaming machines were created almost 100 years later.

And we were not going to wait for the cumbersome machinery of codification to move merely to resolve this conceptual problem…..

THE TAX AUTHORITIES

A different issue is the classification of these relations for tax purposes, since no delay is possible here, and we encounter a sacred general principle of tax law, one of the most important: the facts and transactions to which tax legislation applies cannot be what the parties involved determine and intend them to be, but rather what they really are: Article  17.5 of the General Tax Law (LGT). This is one of the key rules underpinning the tax system, since, without it, everyone would merely have to apply a criterion or designation to legal transactions as they saw fit in order to avoid tax.

The contract linking the machine operating company to the proprietor of the premises, says the Supreme Court, may be whatever it is (in name), but it certainly generates consideration in favour of the proprietor of the establishment, paid by the operating company,  and this is the primary issue for VAT purposes.

From the outset, Circular 8/82, of 20 July, of the Directorate-General for Taxation set out its view of this contract, which was the one most conducive to taxation, and it is this view that the Supreme Court now confirms. The point was to collect more revenue, as with any tax authority.

Not even the “partnership” agreement invoked by the parties from the Valencian Community can be exempted from that consequence. The proprietor of the premises must charge VAT to the operator, and the latter must bear it.

 THE UNIFICATION OF CASE LAW

In fact, the Supreme Court judgment could have passed for a judgment for the “unification of doctrine” under the traditional parameters of appeals in cassation.

For most courts subscribed to the view that the Supreme Court now confirms, but the High Court of Justice of the Valencian Community alone maintained a different position, that of “non-liability”, where the taxpayer proved, more or less, that there was a relationship of a “partnership nature” or “joint operation” between the parties involved in operating the machines. This had the curious particularity that, before the procedural reform, owing to the amount in dispute, which had to exceed €600,000 for an appeal to be admissible, in practice no case before this territorial court could be “taken up” to the Supreme Court. And, following some initial judgments to that effect, no judge “dared” to alter the prevailing doctrine within their own territorial court.

The new configuration of the appeal in cassation is concerned less with the “unification of doctrine” (the traditional procedural ground) than with the new “interest in cassation”, which is what the State Counsel demonstrated in the face of the numerous judgments which, now in 2017 and 2018, continued to uphold this view.

If we add to this the fact that the operating companies requested refunds of the VAT charged to them by hospitality proprietors (unduly, according to the position of the Valencian High Court of Justice), and that several judgments granted those refunds, the appeal in cassation was ready to be served, and it was inevitable that the State Counsel would lodge it.

 THE COURT DECIDES IN FAVOUR OF COLLECTING MORE REVENUE

What was at stake was whether the Valencian position would prevail in the other tax jurisdictions or, conversely, whether the sole exception would be eliminated in Valencia.

Well, as we have said, there is no longer an exception, because the Court considers that, whatever the legal transaction is called, there is always consideration, and that this relationship is subject to VAT. This was indirectly denied by the Valencian position, but the Court rejects it outright. However, since we are dealing with dense reasoning, it is worth analysing it in somewhat greater detail.

LIABILITY

The Chamber uses various arguments to justify liability in every possible case: there is no “joint administrative authorisation”, and in this regard it refers to the different degrees of tax liability in relation to the Gambling Levy (which mirrors VAT and is the reason for the exemption):  the operating company is always the taxable person for the Levy, and the proprietor of the premises is merely a person with joint and several or secondary liability. One thing is the “operation” entailed by the authorisation received by the operating company, and another is the “installation”, which imposes administrative obligations on the proprietor of the establishment.

I consider that the Court subconsciously declares, since it stops short of saying so expressly, that the “cash box” belongs to the operating company (which “actually contracts” with the player), whereas the proprietor of the premises merely receives an amount from the operator, agreed in advance as a percentage by reference to the takings obtained. There is no consideration for a “partnership”, but rather consideration, pure and simple. And this is the core of the relationship, which is subject to VAT.

NO EXEMPTION.

A different issue, which the Supreme Court unravels more laboriously, is whether or not that relationship and consideration are exempt from taxation. And here matters become conceptually complicated, because this depends on various considerations of all kinds and on the complex Spanish regulations.

On the one hand, VAT is a European tax, based on the framework of the Directives emanating from the European Union, and it is therefore necessary to clear the ground as regards the framework within which it operates.

Council Directive 2006/112/EC, of 28 November 2006, establishes as a general rule that gambling services are exempt for technical reasons (above all, the difficulty of establishing the taxable amounts, if they are based on the total amount staked). However, the terms and extent of the exemption are left to the discretion of each Member State.

In Spain, the VAT Law (LIVA) opted to declare the exemption (in contracts entered into with players) in order to avoid double taxation (with the Gambling Levy), but it was then maintained (Article 20.One.19 of the LIVA) that this exemption would not extend to intermediate services such as the one now being adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court. There is a single exception to this general criterion of non-exemption: contracts entered into by entities holding bingo hall licences which do not operate those halls but instead make them available to third-party “service companies”.

And the Supreme Court goes no further than that:  the exemption does not extend to intermediate services generally, and it also invokes another fundamental provision which must never be forgotten in these cases:  the VAT collected constitutes an own resource of the EU, and ceasing to collect it reduces the EEC's budgets.

CONSEQUENCES

The first and direct consequence is that the corresponding judgments expected in the numerous appeals in cassation originating in the Valencian Community will inevitably have to follow the same line, eliminating the historical exception in this Autonomous Community.

The judgments of that High Court of Justice allowing the claims which have been appealed will be overturned, and the refund of input VAT recognised by them will become a mere mirage.

Relations between operators and hospitality proprietors in the Valencian Community may be affected by this version of events because, in many cases, it will alter the contractual parameters currently prevailing. And operators in general will have to handle this “change” with particular “tact”.

In the other Spanish territories, matters will continue as before, with operating companies bearing all amounts of VAT arising from invoices issued by hospitality proprietors, on the terms they had agreed.

UNTIL WHEN?

Thirty-three years ago, with the introduction of VAT, an awareness-raising campaign among operators was already necessary to address this problem, which remains unresolved:  how to “avoid” bearing the VAT charged on relations between the two. A revenue “pot” which, according to differing opinions, may range from 200 to 400 million euros per year in Spain. In those early days, the approach was pragmatic: since it cannot be excluded or avoided, make hospitality proprietors aware of the need for its contractual “sharing”. And that is how matters stand once again with the Supreme Court's position.

But the matter does not end here.

Far from being definitively resolved at European level, the position confirmed by the Supreme Court prompts us to pursue and explore “new conceptual paths” which, in tax matters, are almost infinite. There are new positions founded on a renewed “tax justice”:  if European VAT has neutrality for businesses in its DNA…… why not extend the category of exemption for the service provided to users to “the entire chain” of consideration?

This is not speculation on my part: it is what has already been stated, in relation to games of chance, in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (CJEU judgment of 14-7-2011, Henfling case); or by the European Commission in its Working Paper of 31 March 2015 on betting, prepared by the EU Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs (not yet elevated to Commission level).

It is what the VAT Directive itself already states in relation to insurance agents in Article 135(1)(a).

We have not seen this perspective considered in the Supreme Court judgment, although it could have led to a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU to clarify the Spanish exemption in the LIVA.

And this exploration also encompasses all kinds of agents or intermediaries in lotteries, betting and gambling premises, other than the operator itself. Operators of automatic gaming machines are not alone.

With luck, and surely by some chance, we shall comment further on this matter within the next 33 years.

Carlos Lalanda Fernández

Madrid, 26 March 2019

More publications