Gaming & Gambling

Distance between gaming halls in the Valencian Autonomous Community

Carlos Lalanda ·

Analysis of the Supreme Court (TS) judgment of 22-10-2019 on the distance between gaming halls in the Valencian Autonomous Community.

Law 20/2013 on the Guarantee of Market Unity (LGUM) has proved to be a kind of legislative “boomerang” for the gambling sector, moving in a different direction from that initially envisaged by some of its private-sector economic operators when it was being drafted.

Nobody supposed, of course, that it would have any significance for the public lottery gambling monopolies, SELAE and ONCE, even though its essence and principles lay in achieving the freedom to provide services. Nothing of the sort. But somewhat more was expected of it.

The frustrated expectations of private gambling operators

It was expected, on the contrary, that the winds of the LGUM would bring some rationalisation and simplification to the regulatory and bureaucratic morass surrounding matters such as the proliferation of type approvals for machines and other gambling equipment; or the various authorisation procedures required of manufacturers of such equipment and operators, as businesses, throughout 17 Autonomous Communities. Although some regulatory decisions and agreements between administrations initially appeared to offer some grounds for hope (see the links to some comments on this subject as early as 2015 and in 2017), little or nothing has been achieved in this area either over these almost six years.

The limited interest or persuasive capacity of the Central Administration and the almost unanimous visceral rejection by the Autonomous Communities (CCAA) of adopting common coordination criteria (described in one judgment, in LGUM terminology, as “common technical standards”), and the scant legislative activity to adopt their own measures in their respective Autonomous Community Gambling Laws, have prevented almost any progress in this area.

On the contrary, the recent Constitutional Court (TC) judgments on the LGUM of 22 June 2017  and  of <a href=" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">5 October 2017 annulled some of the provisions permitting single nationwide authorisations (the “authority of origin” criterion), thwarting some tentative attempts to apply the LGUM from this perspective.

Restrictions on freedom of establishment

However, another of the facets and central ideas of the LGUM has indeed taken hold from another perspective of gambling regulation: limiting the opening of new establishments (casinos, bingo halls, gaming halls, betting premises, etc.), and, in the specific case of the judgment examined here, the minimum distance between gaming halls adopted in the Valencian Autonomous Community.

In this area, the Supreme Court judgment of 22 October confirms the nullity of the restriction approved by Autonomous Community Decree 55/2015, which had already been declared in the judgment of the National High Court (AN) of  8 March 2018 because it prevented the authorisation of new gaming halls located less than 800 metres from another already authorised, in breach of the general principles contained in the LGUM concerning the general principle of freedom of establishment, which was itself defined in and derives in greater detail from Community law.

According to the National High Court judgment, any restriction of this nature must meet two requirements laid down in Article 5 of the LGUM: necessity and proportionality. These requirements were not justified by the aforementioned Valencian provision, and its nullity was declared at first instance.

The Constitutional Court judgments mentioned above did indeed annul several articles of the LGUM, but they also examined the challenge and left Article 5 and its related provisions intact, so that they did not affect the judgment delivered on the basis of those provisions. Had the opposite been the case, the appeal would have been upheld because the first decision would have been left without a legislative basis.

The new judgment now delivered by the Supreme Court addresses several grounds of interest for cassation purposes, confirming some and reiterating the nullity of the contested provision.

The LGUM applies to the gambling sector

 Apart from other preliminary matters, an interesting theoretical issue addressed by the Supreme Court on cassation is that the LGUM is capable of applying to the business activity of games of chance and betting, even though Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market (the Services Directive) and Law 17/2009 transposing it exclude this economic sector from their scope (Article 2.2(h) of both).

This issue is resolved clearly by the Supreme Court. The LGUM is not merely the “offspring” of that body of European legislation; its scope is broader, as the cited Constitutional Court judgment and other more recent judgments of the Supreme Court itself had already recalled. Although it does not expressly cite it, it is ultimately referring to Article 38.1 of the Spanish Constitution (CE) (freedom of enterprise).

This resolves a problem of legal certainty for us (the LGUM does apply to this sector), but introduces a further uncertainty, since it means that the “general principles” expressly set out in several of its provisions then apply to the gambling sector. However, these general principles are indeterminate legal concepts which must often be given shape “on a case-by-case basis”.

The judgment “descends into the depths” of the Valencian Autonomous Community case and determines that the distance restriction between gambling establishments does fall within the scope of the LGUM, because it affects freedom of establishment. It then goes on to examine compliance or non-compliance with the legal requirements for adopting these measures.

The “necessity” of the restriction is justified in the Valencian Autonomous Community

 In a clear and instructive manner, the Court argues that restricting the distance between gambling establishments, while constituting a restriction on freedom of establishment, may generally be justified on various grounds, as is indeed established by Spanish and Community case law. These justifications lie both in the formal legal basis of such a measure (Valencian Gambling Law 4/1988, Article 11.8, and, substantively, could be founded on grounds of public policy, public security or public health cited in the case law. For example, in the CJEU judgments of 8/9/2009 or 12/07/2012.

In the present case, the necessity of adopting such a measure in the Valencian Autonomous Community is justified, as it could be in other Autonomous Communities. (Were this not so, most minimum distances imposed by subordinate legislation would be called into question.)

It even goes so far as to “reprimand” the original National High Court judgment on this particular point:  for confusing the consideration of the different requirements that must be met, and correcting its approach for having understood otherwise.

The “proportionality” of the measure, by contrast, is not justified

 By contrast, the Supreme Court judgment then upholds the core of the first-instance decision: the restriction is not valid in this particular case because its “disproportionality” is unjustified, that is, because it sets the distance at 800 metres when the distance required under the previous Decree was 200 metres.

We thus reach the conclusion that, following that general criterion, in other cases the distance adopted will have to be justified (although no exact or approximate benchmark for justification is indicated), and it must then be decided or assessed whether or not it complies with the LGUM. In the Valencian case, we reiterate, no such justification is provided, and the judgment confirms the nullity of that provision.

Finally, nothing is said about the validity of the restriction, even if disproportionate, in the hypothetical event that it had been imposed by the Gambling Law itself.

The paradox is that the LGUM applies to the gambling sector, to the regime governing minimum distances between premises; at a time when, in view of the current delicate situation, both gambling businesses themselves and certain sections of public opinion appear to be demanding the opposite,  under the slogan that “gambling establishments should be limited, and should not be concentrated”. In other words, that minimum distances should be established, the greater the better.

References to the Valencian Autonomous Community’s new Decree 204/2018

 It only remains to say that the legal situation in the Valencian Autonomous Community is entering a phase whose outcome on this point is unpredictable, as we already announced in an earlier article when Decree 204/2018 was published (see https://www.loyra.com/salones-en-la-comunidad-valenciana-un-bucle-sin-fin/). The cassation judgment anticipates and envisages that this subsequent Decree cannot be regarded as “enforcement of the judgment” of the National High Court ordering annulment, nor does it offer it any great praise, quite the contrary: it goes so far as to criticise it, even though it is not the subject of the challenge, for suffering from the same lack of justification when setting the distance at “only” 700 metres (or so it appears to suggest in the Seventh Ground of Law, in fine.). It refers to it expressly when stating that we are dealing with “these legislative amendments (in the plural, Decree 55/2015 and Decree 204/2018) for which the Autonomous Community Administration has not offered even a minimally coherent explanation”

As this second Decree is also being challenged before the courts, although not in this case by the National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC), we shall see what emerges from the new judgment. Even if the cassation criterion is applied (and it too is annulled), the Valencian Government will always have available the emergency solution customarily applied in Catalonia in such cases with similar consequences; this is not the only one: the Government always had another ready in reserve.

Madrid, 24 October 2019.

Carlos Lalanda Fernández

Loyra Abogados

www.loyra.com

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